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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) has been a cornerstone of many exchange 
rate determination models. Barro (1984) even considers PPP to be "the central theoretical 
proposition of international finance." In its absolute version, PPP simply states that the 
equilibrium exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of foreign currency) equals the ratio of 
domestic to foreign price levels. The relative version of PPP requires that percentage changes 
in exchange rates and relative prices be equal over time. 
Despite its theoretical appeal, the empirical evidence about long-run PPP is quite mixed. 
People generally agree that PPP is not a short-run principle in the sense that price level 
movements do not begin to offset exchange rate swings on a monthly or even armual basis, i.e.. 
short-run deviations fix)m PPP can be easily observed. However, the validity of PPP in the long 
nm remains controversial. Some people foimd that the real exchange rate follows a random walk, 
other people rejected the cointegration relationship between exchange rate and prices, these facts 
suggest that shocks have infinitely long-lived effects, and hence the deviation fi-om PPP can 
never be eliminated over time. On the other hand, some researchers reported evidence in favor 
of long-run PPP, they claim the mild convergence toward PPP by saying that the half lives of 
deviations are about three to four years, which is equivalent to 2% monthly speed of adjustment. 
Testing the PPP hypothesis is important since it is used, implicitly or explicitly, at least as 
a long-run relationship, in much of current international economics. For example, early monetary 
models of the exchange rate (see for example the studies in Frenkel and Johnson, 1978) assume 
continuous purchasing power parity, while sticky-price exchange rate models originally 
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developed by Dombusch (1976) allow the exchange rate to deviate from purchasing power parity 
in the short run, although it is retained as a long-run equilibrium condition. Another example 
regarding the importance of the validity of PPP is that we usually imply PPP when we compare 
the standard of living across countries. To see it, let's go further a little bit. First of all, the real 
meaningful index representing the standard of living should be real per-capita output. Let y and 
y* denote the real per-capita output in domestic country and foreign coimtry respectively. Then 
if y>y*, we can claim that the domestic country enjoys a higher standard of living than foreign 
country. However, in the real world, when people try to do this comparision. they simply 
compare per-capita income rather than real per-capita output, i.e., they compare Py and P*y*. 
given P and P* are price levels in domestic country and foreign country respectively. But 
considering that Py and P*y* wind up with different currency units, people naturally lake the 
product of exchange rate e ( expressed as the units of domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency) and P*y* to transform to the same currency measure. Equivalently stated, actually 
people think the domestic country has a higher standard of living than foreign country if and only 
if Py>eP*y*. Now we can clearly see that y>y* can only be infered from Py>eP*y* if P=eP*. 
which is exact absolute version of PPP. Hence, in summary, if PPP does not hold, these 
international comparisions can be quite misleading, e.g., as the work of Kxavis and associates 
(1978,1982,1983) has shown, the real income of poor countries is severely underestimated when 
actual exchange rates are used to make the comparison. The low relative price of non-tradables 
in poor countries yields for poor countries true purchasing power of income significantly above 
what exchange rate-converted income suggests. 
Also, when people claim that a specific currency is "overvalued" or "undervalued", this 
3 
judgement is based on PPP. The currency is "overvalued" when its exchange rate makes 
domestic goods look expensive relative to similar goods sold abroad and "undervalued" in the 
opposite case. Thus, the domestic currency is "overvalued" if and only if P>eP*. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is a careful literature 
review part, it starts with the basis of PPP and is followed by a detailed description of the 
evolution of the PPP tests as well as the results of these tests. Strength and weakness regarding 
each category test are discussed also. At the end of this chapter, we present some possible 
theoretical explanations about why deviations from PPP could arise. 
Chapter 3 stresses on the theoretical explanation of the downward stickness of the price. We 
present four possible sources for asymmetric adjustments of price, in which the last one is a 
partial equilibrium menu cost model approach. The asymmetry of price is carefully discussed 
here to justify the application of asymmetric unit-root test and cointegration test in Chapter 5. 
A detailed description of the prevailing testing methodology as well as the new developed 
asymmetric test methodology of Purchasing Power Parity is given in Chapter 4. It first covers 
conventional unit-root test and cointegration test, namely, Dickey-Fuller test, Engle-Granger test 
and Johansen test. Following that, is the rationale to consider about switching from synunetric 
scenario to asymmetric scenario. Finally, considering that the asymmetric test methodology is 
very new, we fully show in the paper the development of these tests, namely, asymmetric 
Enders-Granger unit-root test and asymmetric Enders-Siklos cointegration test. At the end of this 
chapter, is the power comparison between conventional test methodology and new asymmetric 
test methodology. This part is very essential in the sense that the major flaw of the conventional 
test is the low power to reject. 
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In Chapter 5, we move on to test for PPP by applying the new asymmetric unit-root test and 
cointegration test to a special characteristic data set. There are two improvements here; first, the 
substitution of asymmetric test method to symmetric test method catches the essential 
asyrrunetric adjustments of price and therefore has more power to reject the null hypothesis, this 
is very important in the sense that many people attribute the failure of PPP to the low power of 
conventional test to distinguish between unit-root process and near unit-root process. Secondly, 
to infer PPP firom "law of one price", it is required that the national price index should be 
constructed by using the same mixture of goods and by using the same weights on each good 
across countries. However, in practical, people usually use CPI or WPI as national price index, 
these two indices do not satisfy these requirements. Due to the kindness of Mr.Pippenger. we are 
able to get a new data set which does meet these requirements. These two improvements 
together make the acceptance of long-nm PPP more likely. Our RATS programming results 
support our expectations. We find strong evidence in favor of PPP. Detailed interpretaion of the 
results are given. Also at the end of this chapter, to have further insight into the dynamic 
adjustment process of prices and exchange rates, asyrmnmetric error-correction models are 
estimated and impulse response flmtions are also depicted. Explanations are given by using Italy-
UK case. At the very end of chapter five, we make some efforts to explain the empirical failure 
of PPP in Germany-US case and Germany-Canada case. 
We do a firactional cointegration test comparison in Chapter 6 to demonstrate that the 
incorporation of the asymmetric test methodology is very necesssary to supporting PPP. A more 
powerful mean-reversion detecting method alone, even combined with a better data set, works 
not good enough. This results shows that it is very essential to be aware of the asymmetric 
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adjustment mechanism and take it into prior consideration. 
Chapter 7 is mainly about a Fourier convergence test of PPP. Fourier convergence test is very 
general in that it does not specify a specific alternative hypothesis. Hence it can be used as an 
approximation test for any nonlinear convergence, it is particularly appropriate for the case when 
people have little information concering the real structure. However, our results show that in 
testing PPP. this general method is not very much preferred to the conventional method, let alone 
the threshold model method. The rational is that we do have theoretical justification of applying 
asymmetric threshold method to testing PPP. Hence, the TAR and M-TAR model better captiu"es 
the real adjustment mechanism and in turn performs very well. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Basis of PPP 
One of the first expositions of Pxirchasing Power Parity can be dated back to Cassel's (1922) 
idea that the nominal exchange rate should reflect the purchasing power of one currency against 
another. Cassel proposed that a purchasing power exchange rate exists and it is the rate toward 
which the nominal exchange rate would tend, in the absence of trade imbalances, speculation, 
central bank intervention, and other impediments to trade. 
Simple PPP asserts that exchange rates should be equal to relative price levels in different 
countries. The basic motivation underlying PPP is rather straightforward: first, goods-market 
arbitrage ensures law of one price for each traded good, i.e., 
(2.1) p,(i) = p,'(i)s, 
where p,(i) is the log of the time-t domestic-currency price of good i., p'(i) is the analogous 
foreign-currency price, and s, is the log of the time-t domestic-currency price of foreign 
exchange. 
Law of one price basically says that absent fit)m tariffs and transportation costs, fi"ee trade 
in goods should ensure identical prices across countries. If the law of one price holds for every 
individual good, then it follows naturally that it must hold for any identical basket of goods. 
Most emperical tests, however, do not attempt to compare identical baskets, but use CPIs 
and WPIs instead. Generally, this will lead to the validity problem due to different weights and 
mixes of goods. 
Ever since the initiation of the idea of PPP, a large amount of empirical tests has been 
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done. These studies feature different sample periods, different currencies, different 
specifications, and different estimation methods. 
Sample periods frequently employed are the 1920s ( a period of hyperinflation) and post-
Bretton Woods flexible exchange rates regime that began in 1973. Occasionlly people use fixed 
exchange rate era or the earher period of the gold standard. Some studies span various regimes. 
The currencies investigated also differ, though the majority of studies focus on bilateral 
rates of the industrialized coimtries against the US dollar. Sometimes bilateral rates between two 
countries other than the United States are cross computed fi-om the data set, whereas others 
explicitly select a bilateral rate excluding the US. More recently, purchasing power parity has 
been tested for developing countries. 
The specifications used to test purchasing power parity also varies depending on whether 
the trivariate relationship between the exchange rate, the domestic price series, and the foreign 
price series; the bivariate relationship between the exchange rate and the domestic-foreign price 
ratio; or the univariate real exchange rate is being examined. The trivariate relationship is the 
most general, it imposes neither synunetry ( price coefficients of the same magnitude but 
opposite sign) nor proportionality (price coefficients restricted to be [1,-1]). The bivariate 
specification implicitly imposes symmetry, and the univariate specification imposes both 
symmetry and proportionality. 
The specifications may further differ according to the price series used; WPI and CPI are 
two often choices. It's worth noting that constructing of other price indices are possible. 
Finally, various methods have been employed to test purchasing power parity, especially 
since the mid-1980s, when significant progress on econometrical methods was made. Recent 
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studies use Dickey-Fuller and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the real exchange rate; Perron-
type tests of the real exchange rate allowing for a one-time structural break; variance ratio tests; 
the Engle-Granger two-step method; error correction models; the maximiun likelihood 
estimation procedure by Johansen; and, most recently, fractional integration methods. 
Following Froot and Rogoff (1995), three different stages of PPP tests can be 
distinguished depending on different test methodology. Specifically, they are: 
(1) stage-one tests in which the null hypothesis is that PPP holds 
(2) stage-two tests in which the null hypothesis is that the real exchange rate is a random 
walk. 
(3) stage-three tests in which the null hypothesis is that deviations away from any linear 
combination of prices and exchange rates is permanent 
In the following section, a detailed description of the evolving of testing methodology is 
given. Then the results for each testing methodology as applied to PPP will be examined. 
Three Stages of PPP Tests 
Stage One: Least Square Estimation on Testing Simple PPP 
The special feature of stage-one test is centering on coefficient restrictions. One example 
of this type of test is Frenkel (1978) paper. Frenkel ran regressions of the form 
(2.2) s, = a + P(p,-p,*) + 6, 
for a number of hyperinflationary economies, where the exchange rate s and the domestic and 
foreign price series p and p* are expressed in logarithms, a and P are estimated regression 
coefficients, e is an error term. 
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Frenkel found estimates of P quite close to one during 1920s hyperinflation period while 
far from one during 1970s for industrialized countries. It is worth stressing that Frenkel was not 
so much interested in the properties of the error term, as in whether the slope coefBcient was one. 
The major flaw in the stage-one tests was the failure to take explicitly into account the 
possible nonstationarity of relative prices and exchange rates. Briefly, classical hypothesis 
testing of P=1 is inappropriate when the regressors are nonstationary because their variance do 
not converge to a constant. Reported standard errors will thus be underestimated. 
Another obvious problem with stage-one test is that exchange rates and prices are 
simultaneously determined, and there is no compelling reason to put exchange rates on the left-
hand side, rather than visa-versa. 
Stage Two: The Real Exchange Rate as a Random Walk 
In stage-two tests, the null hypothesis is that the real exchange rate follows a random 
walk, with the altemative hypothesis being that PPP holds in the long run. These tests distinguish 
themselves with stage-one tests in that they impose- rather than estimate- the hypothesis that 
P = I. and test - rather than impose - the hypothesis that the log of the real exchange rate 
(2.3) r,= s,-p,+ p,' 
is stationary. Early stage-two testing job can be foimd from Darby (1983), Adler and Lehman 
(1983), Hakkio (1984), Huizinga (1987) and Meese and Rogoff (1988). 
The main problem with stage-two tests is low power. Now it is widely acknowledged that 
PPP is not a short-rim relationship, price level movements do not begin to offset exchange rate 
swings on a monthly or even annual basis, i.e., if convergence to PPP does exist, this process is 
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rather slow, unfortunately, the prevailing stage-two test methodology (e.g., Dickey-Fuller test) 
has little power to distinguish between a random-walk real exchange rate and a stationary real 
exchange rate that reverts very slowly. This problem turns out to be even serious when applying 
highly volatile floating exchange rates, because the noise can easily mask slow convergence 
toward long-run equilibrium. 
Worrying about the insufficient power, much of the evolution of stage-two testing focused 
on finding longer or broader data sets, and implementing more powerful unit-root tests. Such 
effort can be found fix)m Abuaf and Jorian (1990), Kim (1990). Of course, these efforts usually 
incur the problem of regime change. 
In the following subsections, major stage-two testing methodologies are described. 
Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests 
The Dickey-Fuller (1979) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) tests for a unit root, can 
be adapted to test for nonstationarity in the real exchange rate r„ defined as ( s,-p, - p,'). 
The test specification is: 
(2.4) j.r, = a ^ 0r,., - ^ .r|, .ir,.,., - v, 
where t is a time trend. Lags of ^r, may be necessary to ensure that v, is white noise. The null 
hypothesis is that 0 = 0, which implies that the real exchange rate contains a unit root. 
If the null hypothesis of 0 = 0 cannot be rejected, the real exchange rate is considered a 
random walk. Random walk behavior means that the real exchange rate is the outcome of a 
sequence of real shocks, each of which permanently alters the level of the real exchange rate, 
i.e., there is no tendency for the real exchange rate to return to its mean or trend. Consequently, 
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purchasing power parity cannot hold. 
Equation (2.4) can also be used to calculate Phillips (1987) Z test, which allows for 
conditional heteroskedasticity of the residual. 
Perron-Type Tests 
Perron (1989) criticizes unit root tests based on the fact that a series that is stationary about 
a trend with a one-time structural break mimics the behavior of a unit root series. Thus, the 
power of unit root tests to distinguish bet\^'een alternative hypotheses may be low. 
Perron recommended detrending a series with allowance for a level shift and/or change 
in trend. The researcher may impose the date for the breakpoint based on a priori information, 
or may estimate the breakpoint as in Perron and Vogelsang (1992). Dummy variables are 
introduced to the Dickey-Fuller or augmented Dickey-Fuller test to capture these changes. 
Application of this method on PPP can be found from Perron and Vogelsang (1992) and 
Flynn and Boucher (1993). 
Variance Ratio Tests 
Cochrane (1988) first introduced variance ratio tests for GNP. He exploit the fact that the 
variance of the first difference of a unit-root series grows proportionally with the time separating 
two observations. For example, var(y,-i-yt) = whereas var(y,,k - y,) = k • o^. Thus, for a unit 
root series, var(y,^k - Yt) '' k • var(y.| -y) = 1 for any k= 1, T. On the other hand, for a 
stationary white noise series, the ratio approaches zero as k approaches infinity. Thus, the 
behavior of the variance ratio reveals information about the stochastic behavior of a series. Like 
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the Dickey-Fuller test and the Perron-type tests, the variance ratio tests are typically conducted 
for the real exchange rate. 
Examples of variance ratio tests of PPP are Glen (1992) and Grilli and Kaminsky (1991). 
Fractional Integration Tests 
Fractional integration tests entertain a broader range of alternative hypotheses to the unit 
root hypothesis. A fractionally integrated process allows the real exchange rate to evolve 
according to: 
(2.5) 0(L)(l-L)'^r,= x(L)e, 
where <&(L) and x(L) are polynomial lag operators with roots outside the unit circle and e, is 
white noise. If the parameter d = 0, then the real exchange rate is confined to a class of stationary 
.\RMA processes described by ^(L) and x(L)- If d=I and <I>(L) = x(L) = 1. then the real 
exchange rate follows a random walk. The strength of this class of processes is that it allows for 
fractional integration, i.e., 0<d<l. A series that is integrated of order d where 0<d<l is 
fractionally integrated. Fractionally integrated series exhibit reversion to a mean, but at a much 
slower rate than a stationary series, encompassing them under the alternative hypothesis may 
enhance one's chances of rejecting the random walk null. 
Cheung and Lai (1993b) fmd that the tests tend to have more power than augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests in detecting mean reversion, particularly for 0.35<d<0.65. Fractional 
integration methods rely on spectral analysis and have not yet been widely employed. 
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Stage Three: Cointegration Tests 
Cointegration techniques are designed to test if there exists a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among a few nonstationary variables. It can be used to test weak version of PPP, 
since they require only that some linear combination of exchange rates and prices be stationary. 
To put it in another way, instead of testing the real exchange rate r, = s,-p, -f p,' is stationary as 
in stage-two test, cointegration test asks only whether 
(2.6) s,- HP, + HP,' 
is stationary for any constant |i and n". 
Easy to see, stage-two test imposes both the symmetry and proportionality restrictions by 
setting H = la* = I. Hence, it may simply be thought of as the univariate case. 
.\ny incremental power from stage-three tests over stage-two tests must therefore come 
from relaxing the symmetry and proportionality restnctions. If only proportionality restriction 
is relaxed, it is a bivariate cointegration test, which examines the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the exchange rate and the price ratio. If both restrictions are relaxed, then 
we get the most general trivariate cointegration tests. 
We describe the major cointegartion test methodologies below. 
The Engle-Granger Test for Cointegration 
Engle-Granger tests of cointegration follows a two-step procedure. The test applies either 
the standard or the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root to the residual from the first-
stage "cointegrating regression" of the levels of the variables. For purchasing power parity 
studies where each of [s„ p„ p/] series is nonstationary, the cointegrating regression, using the 
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logarithms of the exchange rate and domestic and foreign price series, is: 
(2.7) s,= a + P,p, + P2p;+n, 
Depending on the specification used, P, may or may not be set equal to -p,. Cheung and 
Lai (1993a) pointed out that the imposition of symmetry may affect conclusions about 
cointegration. They favor the least restrictive version for testing long-run purchasing power 
parity. 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller test for cointegration is; 
(2.8) = 0^., + - 6, 
These tests examine whether 6 = 0, which is equivalent to testing for a unit root in |i,. If 
the hypothesis that 6 = 0 cannot be rejected, the exchange rate and the domestic and foreign 
price series are not cointegrated. The existence of a long-nm relationship would be rejected. 
Engle and Yoo (1987) provide the critical values. Some studies report the closely related Philips-
Perron Z statistics, which take account of possible autocorrelation and heteroskedasticiiy. 
Johansen Test for Cointegartion 
Johansen (1988) method is a maximum likelihood procedure. An inability to reject the null 
hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors means the absence of cointegration. It improves Engle-
Granger test in that it is a one-step full-information maximum likelihood approach, it does not 
require choosing a single right-hand side variable, hence the parameter estimates are more 
efficient, and the Johansen test for cointegration is therefore more powerful than a two-step 
Engle-Granger test. 
Table 2.1 summarizes about twenty-one papers. 
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Studies of Purchasing Power Parity* 
Abuaf and Adler and Ardeni Cheung 




Flexible exchange rates 
1920s 
Pre-World War 11 
Specifications 
[s,p,p"] 
[s.(p-p*)] or [p, s-p*] 
[s-p+p'] 
Price Index 
Consumer price index 
Wholesale price index 
Methods 























found in 7 rejected in 
of 10 most cases 
cases 
No Yes 
^ * means the paper as indicated in the column heading uses the sample period, or 
specification, or method, or price index as indicated by the row heading. 
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Table 2.1: (Continued) 
Cheimg and Choudry et al. Corbae Davuytan 




Flexible exchange rates 
1920s 
Pre-World War 11 
Specifications 
[s,p,p"] 
[s,(p-p")] or [p, s-p*] 
[s-p+p'l 
Price Index 
Consumer price index 
Wholesale price index 
Methods 



















imposed imposed symmetry 
imposed 
Stationary relationship 
between s, p and p* ? 
Yes, but not 
for subsamples 
Yes No Yes 
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Table 2.1: (Continued) 
Diebold et al. Edison and 
Klovland 




Flexible exchange rates 
1920s 
Pre-World War H 
Specifications 
[s,p,p'] 
[s,(p-p*)] or [p, s-p*] 
[s-p+p*] 
Price Index 
Consumer price index 
Wholesale price index 
Methods 



































Table 2.1 :(Continued) 





Flexible exchange rates 
1920s 
Pre-World War n 
Specifications 
[s.p,p'] 
[s,(p-p')] or [p, s-p'] 
[s-p+p*] 
Price Index 
Consumer price index 
Wholesale price index 
Methods 


































Yes, but not 
always for 
Post-World 








Table 2.1: (Continued) 
Kugler and 
Lenz 





Flexible exchange rates 
1920s 
Pre-World War II 
Specifications 
[s,p,p*] 
[s,(p-p*)] or [p, s-p*] 
[s-p+p*] 
Price Index 
Consumer price index 
Wholesale price index 
Methods 
















found for 6 






half the cases proportionality 
found in 3 of 4 
cases 
Stationary relationship 
between s, p and p* ? 
Yes. in 10 of 
15 cases for 
DM-base 
cuirencies 
Yes, in 6 of 
9 cases in 
Latin 
America 





for 3 of 15 
currencies 
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Table 2.1: (Continued) 





Flexible exchange rates 
1920s 
Pre-World War H * 
Specifications 
[s,p,p'] 
[s.(p-p*)] or [p, s-p*] 
[s-p+p*] 
Price Index 
Consumer price index * 
Wholesale price index 
Methods 




Dickey-Fuller * * 




Symmetry and imposed not tested not tested 
proportionality? 
Stationary relationship Yes, with Yes, for 7 of 9 Yes, inmost 
between s, p and p* ? allowance for Swiss franc- cases except 
level shift in based for pound 
mean currencies sterling 
* 
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Results of Testing Purchasing Power Parity 
The major results of stage-one tests are PPP holds for hypermflationary economies while 
strong rejections of PPP can be found outside of hyperinflations. However, due to the obvious 
problem of test methodology, this conclusion does not receive much attention. In the following 
subsections, we'll focus on introducing the main empirical results of stage-two and stage-three 
tests. 
Results of Stage-Two Tests 
Results for Post-Bretton Woods Data 
The basic fact in the empirical literature is that if one applies unit-root tests to bilateral 
industrialized country monthly data, it is difficult to reject the null of a unit root for currencies 
that float against each other. 
For currency pairs that are fixed, the results are mixed. In Mark's (1990) tests for the 1973-
1988 period, the intra-European exchange rate come closest to rejecting a random walk, although 
it is only for the Belgium/Germany currency pair that a random walk null can be rejected at the 
5% confidence level. Chowdhury and Sdogati (1993) look at the 1979-1990 period, when the 
EMS was in place, they strongly reject the random walk for bilateral rates of various European 
currencies against the Deutsche mark, but not for European exchange rates against the U.S. 
dollar. 
Early stage-two tests usually employed post-1973 data, due to the short time span which 
is available and the fact that the reversion to PPP, if it does exists, tend to be rather slow, people 
are very concerned about the fact that stage-two tests lack sufficient power to reject. The 
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solutions to this problem come either from expanding data set or from employing more powerful 
test methodology or both. 
Actually, much of the evolution of stage-two tests stressed on expanding data set. To see 
how important the issue of power is, and to gain a sense of how much data is needed to reject 
plausible alternatives, we can refer to Frankel (1986, 1990), according to his autoregression 
results, 72 years of monthly data are needed to reject random walk null if the true half-life of PPP 
deviations is 36 months (3 years). Obviously, with a longer half life, even more data would be 
required. Therefore, the Post-Bretton Woods sample period is far too short to reliably reject the 
random walk hypothesis. 
Two approaches to dealing with the power problem from the data perspective have been 
tried in the past; one is to look at a number of currencies simultaneously, and the other is to look 
at long-horizon data sets encompassing both pre- and post-Bretton Woods data. 
Tests Using Cross Section Data 
Easy to see. if four currencies are simultaneously used, then 18 years of data would be 
sufficient to reject the null hypothesis given the half life of PPP deviation is 36 months, (since 
18-4 = 72). Hakkio (1984) firstly used cross-section data to gain power, he employed GLS to 
allow for cross exchange rate correlation in the residuals in four exchange rates against the 
dollar. In spite of the enhanced power of his test, Hakkio was unable to reject the random walk 
model. 
Abuaf and Jorion (1990) did a similar job. Ciurencies of 10 industrialized coimtries are 
studied over the period 1973-1987. The US dollar is the base currency. Mild rejection of random 
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walk hypothesis was found due to gained power. 
The most positive evidence in favor of PPP might be Cumby (1993) 's interesting 
"Hamburger" study, by using 7 years (1987-1993) of the dollar price of McDonald's Big Mac 
in up to 25 countries, Cumby found that the large cross-section yields enough power to detect 
reversion toward the law of one price. Namely, only 30% of the deviation in one year pass to the 
next. 
Tests Using Longer Time Span 
The second way to improve power is to extend the sample period, e.g., Frankel (1986) 
applies 116 years (1869-1984) of data for the dollar/pound real exchange rate; Edison (1987) 
estimated error-correction mechanism by using dollar/pound data for the years 1890-1978; 
Johnson employed 120 years of Canadian doIlar/U.S. dollar exchange rate data; .Abuaf and 
Jorion (1990) use time series data from 1901-1972 for eight currencies; Glen (1992) uses 
variance ratios to test for mean reversion in the real exchange rate for 9 bilateral exchange rates 
over the 1900-87 period. 
The common results of the above studies are statistically significant convergence toward 
PPP. The half life of PPP deviation ranges from 3-7 years. 
It is worth noting here that the long-sample smdies all combine low variance pre-Bretton 
Woods exchange rate data with the highly volatile post-Bretton Woods data. Because the 
convergence appears easier to detect in fixed rate than in floating rate, these papers actually did 
not answer the question of whether mean reversion would be detected in 100 years of floating 
rate data, for example. Lothian and Taylor (1994) attempted to cast some light on this issue. By 
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using a simple Chow-test to compare first-order AR coefficients before and after Bretton Woods, 
they find that the null of no structural change cannot be rejected. Hence, they conclude that no 
evidence supports the view that the inclusion of fixed-rate periods biases unit roots tests of the 
real exchange rate. 
Results of Stage-Three Tests 
Lots of people have applied cointegration approach to test for PPF. A partial list includes 
Edison and Klovland (1987), Corbae and Ouliaris (1988), Enders (1988), Kim (1990), .Mark 
(1990), Fisher and Park (1991), Cheung and Lai (1993a), and Kugler and Lenz (1993). Surveys 
include Giovannetti (1992) and Breuer (1994). 
Generally, cointegration tests are more successfiil than stage-two tests in rejecting the 
random walk hypothesis. Within the cointegration tests, rejections of the no-cointegration null 
occur more frequently for trivariate systems than for bivariate systems. Hence, one can conclude 
that weakening the proportionality and symmetry restrictions makes the residuals appear more 
stationary. 
To get more detailed inference of cointegration tests, let's give a description of two typical 
papers in the following: 
Cheung and Lai (1993a) 
Cheung and Lai (1993a) use the Johansen method for the trivariate system [s„ p„ p,']. The 
method imposes neither the symmetry nor the proportionality restriction. For the sake of 
comparison, Cheung and Lai redo the estimation for the bivariate system [s„ (p,-p,*)]. They also 
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perform augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for a unit root in the real exchange rate. A comparison 
of the methods illustrates the dramatic change in results when the symmetry and/or the 
proportionality restriction is imposed. Their data cover 1974-89 and five industrialized country 
currencies, with the US dollars as the base currency. They report results for both the consumer 
price index and the wholesale price index. 
Cheung and Lai report evidence of cointegration for all five currencies. They reject the 
hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors. In some cases, they reject the hypothesis of one 
cointegrating in favor of two, which means that the exchange rate and the domestic and foreign 
price series are pairwise cointegrated. The coefficient estimates of p, and — as in equation (7) 
~ vary from a low of 1.035 to 25.422 when the consumer price index is used, and from 0.35 to 
11.414 when the wholesale price index is used. In all cases, except for the dollar-pound rate 
using WPI, proportionality is rejected. In four out of five cases symmetry is rejected when the 
CPl is used and in three out of five cases when the WPI is used. 
Cheung and Lai compare these results with results using bivariate and univariate 
specifications. For the univariate real exchange rate, which imposes the symmetry and 
proportionality, they find that unit root behavior cannot be rejected for the real exchange rate, 
regardless of the price index used. Results from the bivariate specifications are more similar to 
those from the trivariate specifications. 
Kim (1990) 
Kim (1990) compares several different tests for long-run purchasing power parity. Using 
the Phillips-Perron Z statistics, he tests for a unit root in the real exchange rates of five currencies 
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of industrialized countries. He also uses the Engle-Granger test for a unit root in the 
cointegrating regression residual from a bivariate specification. Finally, he estimates an error 
correction model and tests for the significance of the equilibrium error term as a way of detecting 
long-run purchasing power parity. He compares results for the consumer price index with those 
from the wholesale price index. His data roughly cover 1900-87. He also examines subperiods. 
Kim finds the real exchange rate to be stationary when the wholesale price index is used 
for all five currencies. However, when the consumer price index is used instead, only the French 
franc-dollar rate is stationary. Thus, cointegration is detected more frequently when the 
wholesale price index is used at least with the univariate specification. The Engle-Granger 
method for the bivariate specification is also used. In four of five cases cointegration is 
confirmed using the wholesale price index. Results from the error correction model find the same 
thing. The Engle-Granger method detects cointegration in only two of five cases when the 
consumer price index is used. 
How Could Deviations from PPP Arise? 
General Explanation 
Since the law of one price is the central building block of PPP. any factor leading to the 
failure of this law could lead to the failure of PPP as well. Hence the first straightforward reason 
for deviations from PPP is the presence of nontradables or "home" goods. We ioiow that 
arbitrage keeps relative prices between tradables equal across countries, but this breaks down for 
relative prices between nontradables as well as between tradables and nontradables. Also, it is 
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worth noting here that even highly "traded" goods embody substantial nontraded inputs. For 
example, the retail price of bananas includes not only the traded goods inputs, but local shipping, 
rent and overhead for the retailer, and labor. As a matter of fact, for many seemingly highly-
traded goods, these indirect costs can far outweight direct traded-goods costs. Consequently, the 
deviations from law of one price not only arise from nontradable goods but also could arise from 
traded goods. 
To see it more clearly, suppose the real exchange rate is q, s s, - p, p,* and the price index 
in each country is a weighted average of traded and nontraded goods prices, i.e., 
(2.9) P, = YP/ + (1-Y)P.'' 
(2.10) p; = YV^(1-Y^)P.'^' 
Then, we can write, 
(2.11) q, = (s, - p/ - p,=^^) -(Y-l)(p/- P.^) - (Y*-l)(P,''-P,"') 
so real exchange rate depends on deviations from the law of one price in traded goods, as well 
as on the relative price of traded and nontraded goods within each country. Think about the case 
Y=Y*- then the sum of the second and third term on the right hand side equals zero if and only 
if p/- p,'^= • But we know from the first paragraph of this section it cannot be true. 
Therefore, the existence of nontradables contribute to the deviation from PPP. Moreover, the first 
term on the right hand side represents the part of the role of tradable goods. Rogers and Jenkis 
(1995) find that on average, 81 percent of the variance in the real CPI exchange rate is explained 
by changes in the relative price of traded goods. Equivalently stating, the deviations fix)m the law 
of one price in traded goods dominate real exchange rate fluctuations. Because CPI is a retail 
price index, this supports the view that retail goods generally contain substantial nontraded 
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components. 
In addition to the arbitrage perspective explanation, structural model can also be given to 
explain the deviation from PPP. This kind of model focuses on more fiindamental factors such 
as productivity, government spending, and strategic pricing decisions by firms. .Among the 
many structural models, the most famous one is Balassa (1964)-Samuelson model, in which they 
claim that after adjusting for exchange rates, CPIs in rich countries will be higher relative to 
those in poor countries, and that CPIs in fast-growing countries will rise relative to CPIs in slow-
growing countries. 
The main logic of Balassa-Samuelson model is as follows: first of all. technological progress 
has historically been faster in the traded goods sector than in the nontraded goods sector. 
.Moreover, this traded-goods productivity bias is more pronounced in rich countries. As a 
consequence. CPI levels tend to be higher in wealthy countries. Why? increased productivity in 
the traded-goods sector increases wages in that industry and hence raises economy-wide wages, 
but without accompanying productivity gains (or only with a relative smaller productivity gain) 
in the nontraded-goods sector, costs and prices there must rise and hence the growing country's 
relative price of nontraded goods will rise. We know the CPI weights more on nontraded goods, 
therefore, CPI will go up. Because the productivity growth bias is more pronounced in rich 
countries, we can claim that CPI will increase more in rich countries than in poor countries. 
Another category of the models which can explain the deviations from PPP are called "Asset 
Approach", e.g., Dombusch (1976) model. An essential feature of these models is that 
commodity markets adjust slowly relative to asset markets. As a result, commodities are 
nontradable in the short run and tradable in the long-run. This model explains short-run 
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deviation through the "overshooting" of exchange rate, but implies long-run deviation should 
be eliminated gradually. 
Also, as we will discuss in detail in Chapter 5, unequal weights in the price indices 
introduces measurement error and is a potential reason for the deviation from PPP. 
Dornbusch (1980) Model Approach about PPP Deviations Due to Productivity Gain 
Let's consider about a two-country, infinity-good model in which labor is the only factor of 
production. Constant return to scale is assumed so that for each industry, there is a constant unit 
labor requirement. Across countries technology differ, i.e., unit labor requirements differ. To 
deal with the many-commodity case, in Figure 2.1 we choose as our horizontal axis the unit 
interval (0,1) and we assume that to each point on the interval there corresponds a particular 
commodity. Let z be an index that ranges from zero to one. Then we can index commodoties by 
z. 
Then we denote a(z) as the unit labor reqiiirement of commodity z in the home country and 
a*(z) abroad. The relative unit labor requirement is defined as 
(2.12) A(z)= a*(z)/a(z) 
which is a measure of the relative technical efficiency at home and abroad. 
We depict A(z) schedule in the fashion of decreasing relative efficiency, i.e., we place 
toward the origin the conomodities for which the home country has relatively low unit labor 
requirement, and toward the unity, we place those for which the foreign country is relatively 
more efficient. Suppose the equilibrium domestic and foreign wage rates are W and W* 






Figiire 2.1. Dombusch (1980) Model about PPP Deviation 
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= W/W*), are those commodities produced by home country, while to the right of ZQ, are those 
produced by foreign country. It's easy to see, 
(2.13) Zo = <t)(W/W*) 4)'<0. 
It can be easily infered from (2.13) that with a higher relative wage the home country is less cost 
competitive, thus producing a smaller range of goods. 
Assume the price level is an weighted index of the three sets of prices - importables, 
exportables, and nontraded goods: 
(2.14) p = pj''-«'= 
where P, is a price index of all the commodities in a particular group. In comparing the two 
countries's indexes we note immediately that they face the same traded goods prices and the law 
of one price holds for the traded goods. From (2.14), relative price level can be expressed as: 
(2.15) P/P=^ = (PyP„-)'-'' 
For simplicity we can imagine a single home good with a unit labor requirement c per umt of 
output and c* abroad. With prices equal to unit costs we then have: 
(2.16) P/P* = (cW/c^W*)'-" H P(WAV»)'-^ 
where P = (c/c*)'"'' represents the relative level of labor productivity in the home goods sector. 
(2.16) shows that relative price levels are determined by labor productivity in the home goods 
sector and by relative wages. 
We now turn to the role of productivity change in the traded goods sector of home country 
and investigate their impact on relative price levels. Inspection of Figure 2.1 shows that the 
growth in domestic productivity in the traded goods sector shifts the A(z) schedule upward as 
domestic labor requirements are reduced. For a given relative wage that implies an increase in 
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the range of goods produced at home and the demand for goods and labor at home goes up. With 
an excess demand for domestic goods at the initial equilibrium we now have an adjustment in 
relative wages. Our relative wage rises, thereby partially offsetting the gain in cost 
competitiveness. 
The rise in the home country's equilibrium relative wage implies by (2.16) that our price 
level rises relative to that abroad. The reason is that the increased labor productivity in the traded 
goods sector leads to a rise in money wages and therefore to a rise in costs and prices of 
nontraded goods where productivity has not changed. As relative price levels are determined by 
home goods prices, the relative price level of the country experiencing productivity growth must 
increase. 
Balassa (1964) has shown that the theoretical argument has empirical support. Taking the 
GNP deflator as a comprehensive price index, including both nontraded and traded goods, he 
showed that countries with high productivity growth experience a rise in the GNP deflator. 
"Pricing To Market" Theory 
It has been noticed very early that similar or even identical goods can be sold at significantly 
different prices in different markets. This difference is too large to be explained by transportation 
costs and/or other trade barriers. One famous example is automobile, e.g., in the early 1990s, a 
Nissan automobile built at the Japanese company's Sunderland plant in northeast England could 
be bought from a dealer near the plant for £16,215. The same model sold in Japan for only 
£13,375— despite the cost to Nissan of shipping the car 10600 miles from Sunderland to Tokyo. 
It is also strongly remarked that the prices of many imports into the United States did not fall to 
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the degree that one might expect given the strong dollar of the early 1980s. The prices of 
European luxury cars even rose in US dollar terms despite huge depreciation in European 
currencies against the US dollar. Since prices in Europe, in European currencies, did not rise 
dramatically, the effect was to create large differences between prices of the same automobiles 
in the United States and Europe, so large that it actually gave rise to "gray markets" in which 
individuals and firms bypassed normal distribution channels to import automobiles directly fi-om 
Europe. 
According to Krugman (1987, p 49), "the phenomenon of foreign firms maintaining or even 
increasing their export prices to the United States when the dollar rises may be described as 
'pricing to market' (PTM) It's easy to see, PTM is an example of the deviation fi-om law of one 
price in traded goods. If it does play an important role in bilateral trade, then PPP could fail 
between these two countries. A number of smdies, including Knetter (1989), find that PTM is 
more pronounced for Germany and Japanese exporters than it is for American exporters. 
Moreover, Kmgman (1987) looked at Germany-US trade pattern and claimed that PTM can be 
easily detected in the industry of machinery and transport equipment, which is a very large 
trading sector between the two countries. This fact serves as a very nice reason for the empirical 
failure of PPP between US and Germany as shown later in this dissertation. 
In the following we give three model explanations due to Krugman (1987) about PTM 
phenomenon. The first two are static models in the sense that the belief on the part of firms that 
the dollar's rise is temporary does not play any role in their pricing behavior. The last one is the 
dynamic model in that in the model it is assumed to be crucial that the dollar's rise is taken to be 
temporary. 
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Supply and Demand 
Imagine a two-country world, namely, U.S. and EC, two currencies, dollar and ecu. Let P 
be the dollar price of some U.S. importable, P* the ecu price, and e the number of ecus per 
dollar. Also, let S(P), S*(P*) be the supply from each region, while D(P) and D*CP*) are the 
demands. Then equilibrium may be described by: 
(2.17) S(P) + S*CP*) - D(P) - D»(P*) = 0 
In addition, we assimie law of one price: 
(2.18) P* = eP 
Equilibrium assuming law of one price and the effects of a dollar appreciation may be 
illustrated as in Figure 2.2. Clearly a dollar appreciation will lead to the fall of dollar price and 
the rise of the ecu price. Thus, the dollar price does not fail in full proportion to the appreciation. 
Hence, this model can explain why the dollar prices of BMWs fail to fall in proportion to the 
dollar's rise, but it cannot explain why these prices have fallen in Europe relative to the United 
States (i.e., a fall in P* relative to eP). 
The key observance is by asserting the law of one price, the possibility of price divergence 
between the U.S. and EC is ruled out. To modify this model, we assume that there were an 
upward-sloping supply curve for transportation of importables to the U.S. market. Then the law 
of one price would be replaced with a new relation of the form: 
(2.19) P» = eP-t 
where t is marginal transport cost, and is increasing in the volume of U.S. imports: 
(2.20) t = t(D-S) 




Figure 2.2. BCrugman Supply and Demand Model about Pricing to Market 
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a rise in U.S. imports. The rise in imports would be associated with a rise in marginal 
transportation costs, and thus with a widened gap between U.S. and EC prices. 
Then there comes the question about how plausible is it to suppose that marginal 
transportation costs are strongly upward sloping. In this sense, this model has flaw. 
Monopolistic Price Discrimination 
Let's assume a monopolistic firm that can sell either in the United States or the EC and that 
it has a constant marginal cost in ecus. Transport costs will be ignored. Then the monopolist's 
optimal pricing rule is: 
(2.21) P* = C*E*/(E* - I) 
(2.22) eP=c*E/(E-l) 
where c* is marginal cost in ecus, and E and E* are the elasticity of market demand in the United 
States and EC, respectively. E and E* may of course depend on P and P*. 
From (2.21), P* is invariant to e. The question is whether a rise in e will produce a more or 
less than proportional change in P. 
Clearly, if the demand curve has constant elasticity, the U.S. price will fall in full proportion 
to the exchange rate change. In order to get pricing to market, we must have a fall in the 
elasticity of demand, that is, the elasticity of demand must be increasing in the price ( so that it 
falls as the price falls). 
In principle, price-discriminating monopoly can explain PTM if demand curves have the 
right shape. For luxury goods, we know, the elasticity of demand tends to be an increasing 
function of price. 
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Dynamic Model 
In this model we ask whether slow adjustment of demand to the market price will give rise 
to a slow adjustment of the price itself. Suppose that there are lags in the effect of price on 
demand. Then a fim's pricing decision will in effect have a trade-off between low profits now 
and higher sales later. 
Consider a foreign firm that plans to sell a good in the United States over two periods. In 
the first period it faces a demand D,(P,), in the second a demand D^CPi. P;), Marginal costs are 
c* 'e,, c*Iq2- The firm will seek to maximize 
(2.23) (e,P, - c*) D,(P,) - R(e,P, - c=*) D:(P„ P.) 
where R is a discount factor. 
The essential question is whether P, will fall more if the exchange rate rises in both periods 
than it rises only in the first period. That is, will an exchange rate appreciation that is regarded 
as temporary have less effect on the price than one that is regarded as permanent? The answer 
to this question lies on how the second-period appreciation affects the incentive of the firm to 
keep its first-period price down. Note that the derivative of second-period profits with respect 
to P, is: 
(2.24) (dX,/ dP,)(e2P, - c*) < 0 
where X, is second-period sales, this may be rewritten as: 
(2.25) [(dX,/ dP,)(P,/X,)][(e2P, - c*)X,]/P, 
The first term in square brackets here is the cross elasticity of demand; the second term is 
second-period profits. The conclusion is that if expression (2.25) increases in absolute value in 
e,, there will be an increased incentive to hold down the first-period price. 
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CHAPTER 3. ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENTS OF PRICE 
Classical economists predict that markets are continuously cleared by flexible prices with 
instantaneous adjustment mechanism to external shocks. Keynesian theories, in contrasL claim 
sluggish price responses. Both of academic schools foimd empirical evidence. Namely, 
inflationary episodes support classical standing point while price adjustment behavior during 
contractions are more in favor of Keynesian prediction. 
It seems that the conclusions of both sides can be reconciled into one single model with 
asymmetries in price adjustments, i.e.. maybe they all describe price behavior correctly, but in 
different stages of business cycles. This claim can only be made if price respond asymmetrically 
to positive and negative deviations from the trend. To be specific, prompt producer corrections 
of prices that are below trends can account for the essential classical feature of flexible price 
responses. Conversely, reluctance to margin reductions for prices that are above trends can 
support the Keynesian description of slow adjustment that leaves prices at excessively high 
levels. 
First of all, we define the positive asymmetry of price as the fact that prices are more readily 
to be raised in response to positive shocks than to be lowered in response to negative shocks. 
Then, the natural follow-up question is to detect the possible sources of positive asymmetries in 
price adjustment. In the following subsections, a few theories about the rationals regarding the 
positive asymmetry of price are given. 
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Theory One: Strategic Pricing by Oligopolistic Competitors 
In their "trigger price" model of oligopolistic coordination. Green and Porter (1984) pointed 
out that in response to a negative cost shock, a firm might choose to maintain a prior price until 
demand conditions force a change. 
Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) flutherly investigate the responsiveness of retail 
gasoline price to crude oil price change, they find that in the retail gasoline market each firm 
chooses its selling price with imperfect information about the prices charged by others. Firms 
may choose to maintain prices above competitive (Nash) levels in response to negative cost 
shocks as long as their sales remain above a threshold level. A significant drop in sales would 
indicate price cutting by rival firms and would justify a price deduction as an optimal 
competitive response. 
On the other hand, a significant positive crude price shock would trigger retail price 
increases, otherwise, retail margins would become negative given the typical thin margins in 
gasoline distributions. However, retail prices need not respond immediately to a negative crude 
price shock. The above observations together can explain the asymmetric pricing behavior by 
retail gasoline outlets. Of course, over time, random shocks in demand would lead the retailers 
to cut their prices in response to the threat of price cutting by rival firms. 
While appealing, this theory has dificiencies. It explains how retailers may sustain prices 
above competitive levels, but does not explain how retailers will coordinate on a particular price. 
Actually there are multiple equilibria with prices above the competitive level. The three authors 
claim that the price that firms charged before a shock lowering wholesale prices is a natural focal 
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point for coordination. Hence, an oligopolistic coordination equilibrium of the kind described 
here is consistent with a rapid response of prices to positive cost shocks and a slow response to 
negative shocks. 
To summary, the response to cost shocks would be asymmetric because retailers would 
refrain from cutting prices in response to a negative shock and would instead rely on prevailing 
prices as a focal point for oligopolistic coordination. Retailers would not exercise similar 
restraint after a positive cost shock because they will lose money if they did not raise prices 
immediately after a significant positive cost shock. 
The theory is sufficiently general to describe the price adjustment of other commidities. 
Theory Two: Instrument Uncertainty 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989) show that the producers tend to rely more on quantity 
adjustments than price adjustments over the business cycle by applying the analysis of Brainard 
(1967) on instniment uncertainty. The underlying assumptions are risk averse producers and 
price adjustments are perceived to be more risky than quantity adjustments. 
Despite that instrument uncertainty was first used to interpret the (symmetric) mertia of 
producer prices, this theory can be modified to explain positive asymmetry in producer prices 
by adding an asymmetry due to costs of illiquidity. This altered theory has two essential building 
blocks: (i) the profit variance associated with price changes is significantly larger than that of 
output changes; and (ii) producer risk varies countercyclically due to imperfect credit markets. 
Under the first condition, costs due to production change, such as worker hires or layoffs, 
are relatively predictable, and thus less risky. On the other hand, price changes have more 
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uncertain impacts on profit due to unpredictable customer or competitor responses. 
Under the second condition, in boom periods with large accumiUations of retained earnings, 
the probability of exhausting internal liquid asset reserves is small, little attention is paid on the 
risk exposure associated with price variations and both price and output are varied to maximize 
the discounted stream of expected profits. However, in bad times, there is great concern about 
the uncertainty of projected receipts of cash flows. Producers become more cautious about 
changing prices to alter expected sales and respond to reduced demand by cutting plarmed 
production. 
Theory Three: Wage Inertia 
The downward stickiness of nominal wages will translate into the downward stickiness of 
producer price if the purchase of labor inputs is a major component of operating costs. Keynes 
(1936) suggests that employees may resist reduction in nominal wages because it is difficult for 
atomistic agents to coordinate their actions. Moreover, the efficiency wage hypothesis made by 
new-Keynesian economists suggests that the employers may also resist to lower wage level in 
fear that the loss of productivity might overpower the gain due to lower labor cost. 
Theory Four: Menu Cost Model with Positive Trend Inflation 
A Partial Equilibrium Approach 
We consider a menu-cost model developed by Ball and Mankiw (1994) in which firms make 
regularly scheduled price changes, and by paying a menu cost, can also make special adjustments 
in response to shocks. In this model, asymmetries arise naturally with the addition of one feature: 
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positive trend inflation. 
With trend inflation, positive shocks to firms' desired prices trigger greater adjustment than 
negative shocks of the same size. The intuition is that inflation causes firms' relative prices to 
decline automatically between adjustments. When a firm wants a lower relative price, it need not 
pay the menu cost, because inflation does much of the work. By contrast, a positive shock means 
that the firm's desired relative price rises while its actual relative price is falling, creating a large 
gap between desired and actual prices. As a result, positive shocks are more likely to induce 
price adjustment than are negative shocks, and the positive adjustments that occur are larger than 
the negative adjustments. 
To see the above claims in detail, let's present in the following a partial equilibrium model 
in which trend inflation and costs of price adjustment produce asymmetric responses to shocks. 
.Assumptions and Specifications of the Model 
Consider a single firm, let's define the following notations first: 
0: the firm's desired relative price in log. 
p; aggregate price level in log. 
Tc: steady inflation rate, which the firm takes as exogenous. 
We can conclude fix)m the above that the firm's desired nominal price is p+0. the price level 
in period t is p, = TCt, assuming po= 0. 
The firm adjusts the price as follows; every even period, after observing the current 0, the 
firm sets a single price for that period and the following odd period. However, it's not guaranteed 
that the firm will defend the price firmly. The firm can make an extra adjustment in an odd 
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period by paying a menu cost C. usually the finn does so when there is a large shock to 0. 
This specification combines time-contigent price adjustment (Ball et al. 1988) and state-
contigent price adjustment (Caplin and Spulber, 1987). In accordance with the time-contigent 
model, the firm makes a regular schedule adjustment (every two periods); meanwhile, the firm 
also have the option to adjust in response to significant circumstances change, which provides 
the state-contigent model attributes. 
It makes a lot of sense to combine these two polar cases in that price setting in actual 
economies has elements of both. Indeed, labor contracts are reviewed for fixed periods but can 
also be rewritten in special case. 
The last important specification is about the firm's one-period loss ftmtion. 
(3.1) loss ftmtion= (q-q*)" - DC 
where q is the firm's actual price, q"= p+0 is its desired price, D is a dummy that equals one if 
the firm pays the menu cost. The firm chooses even-period prices and whether to adjust in odd 
periods to minimize the average of its loss, with no discounting. If the firm does adjust in an odd 
period, it chooses the current q'. Finally, let's impose the restriction that C>u-'4. 
A One-Time Shock 
In this part we show the asymmetry in our model in the simple case of a one-time shock. We 
assume that, in period zero, the firm acts as if the probability of ftiture shocks is zero. Whereas 
a shock occurs in period one. 
We start by assuming that the desired relative price 0 is zero in period zero and is expected 
to remain the same since the firm does not anticipate a shock. The firm's optimal nominal price. 
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p+0, equals zero in period zero and is expected to rise to TI: in period one. Given its quadratic 
loss, the firm chooses a price of 7t/2, the average of the two desired prices. 
In period one, the shock happens: the firm's desired relative price changes to 0«O. To see 
how the firm may response, consider first its desired price adjustment. The fim's ex post optimal 
price is TC+0, and its actual price entering the period is u/l. The desired adjustment is the 
difference between the two: 
(3.2) Desired adjustment = tz/2 + 9 
It is very important to note that the desired adjustment is asymmetric: the magnitude of the 
desired adjustment is larger for a positive 0 than for a negative 0 given tzJ2 is positive. The 
intuition is that, in the absense of shocks, inflation in period one pushes the firm's desired price 
q" past its actual price q. A positive 0 pushes q' even fiirther above q, creating a large desired 
adjustment. By contrast, a negative 0 reduces q* ; in this case, the shock offsets the need to catch 
up with inflation, and the firm desires a relatively small price changes. 
This asymmetry in desired price adjustments leads to an asymmetrv' in actual adjustments. 
With a menu cost, a firm either chooses to make adjustment or not. If the firm does not adjust, 
the loss is (q-q*y= (ic/I + 0)^. If the firm does adjust, all the loss is menu cost C. Thus the firm 
fails to adjust if C> (71/2 0)^. Equivalent interval is: 
(3.3) 06[-v/C--n:/2, v/c-7r/2] 
The first point to make is that the firm fails to adjust for a range of shocks. More important, 
this range is asymmetric: the lower bound is larger in absolute value than the upper bound. 
Relatively small positive shocks trigger adjustment, whereas prices are sticky for a larger range 
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of negative shocks. Finally note that even if 0 lies outside the range (3.3), so the firm adjusts, 
the price change is larger for a positive 0 than for the corresponding negative 0. Both the 
asymmetry in the non-adjustment range and the asymmetry in the size of adjustments are 
demonstarted from this model. 
A Distribution of Shocks 
We now assume the firm faces a known distribution of shocks. Specifically, in period zero 
the desired relative price 0 is zero; in period one it is drawn from a zero-mean, symmetric, and 
single-peaked distribution with cumulative distribution function F(0). The knowledge that a 
shock may trigger adjustment in period one influences the price the firm sets in period zero. We 
solve jointly for the initial price, denoted x, and for the firm's price-adjustment rule. 
Think of the behavior of the firm in period one. in period one. the firm takes x as given, 
since the firm's desired price is tz^Q. its desired adjustment is (ir+O-x). Similar to the previous 




Notice that positive shocks induce adjustment more quickly than negative shocks as long as xcr. 
Consider now behavior in period zero, the firm chooses the initial price x to minimizes: 
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9 
(3.5) Loss=x-^J'(T:+d-xfdFCd)+[l -(F(0)-F(S))]C 
ft 
The first term in this expression is the firm's loss in period zero, the other terms are the 
expected loss in period one: the loss is (•ir+0-x)^if 9 is in interval (3.4), and C if not in (3.4). The 
first order condition for minimizing (3.5) with respect to x leads to 
0 
Using equation (3.4) and (3.6), one can show that 
(3.7) 0<X<7C/2 
The fact that the initial price x is less than n/2 means that ex post price adjustment is even 
more asymmetric here than in the case of a one-time shock. This result is straightforward by 
comparing (3.4) and (3.3): the range of non-adjustment is shifted further to the left. 
(3.6) x = {7r(F(0)-F(fi))^|0c/F(0)] 
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CHAPTER 4. TEST METHODOLOGY 
Conventional Unit-Root Test and Cointegration Test 
Dickey-Fuller Test 
Unit-Root hypothesis test is widely used for inferring whether a time series 
{yt} follows a random walk or is stationary. It was first developed by Dickey and Fuller 
(1979.1981). To summarize briefly, consider the simple AR( I) model for {yt} with zero -
mean, white noise innovations, 
(4.1) yt = -'/yt-i 
It is easy to see that if y is equal to unity, {yt} follows a random walk. If-l<y<l, 
the sequence {yt} is stationary. To make equation (1) be more convenient for our 
purposes, reformulate it as: 
(4.2) Ay, = Y* y,-i 
where y' = y - 1. With this formulation, the Dickey-Fuller test for a unit-root is carried 
out by testing the hypothesis that y* equals zero. 
Dickey and Fuller pointed out that the conventional t-test will tend, incorrectly, 
to reject the null hypothesis Ho: y* =0 due to biased estimator in the presence of unit 
root.The practical solution to this problem devised by Dickey and Fuller was to derive, 
through Monte Carlo methods, an appropriate set of critical values for testing the 
hypothesis that y* equals zero in an AR( 1) regression when there truly is a unit root, i.e., 
the hypothesis may be carried out with a conventional t-test, but with a revised set set of 
critical values. A few of the critical values are reproduced in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Dickey-Fuller Critical Values 
0.01 0.025 0.05 0.10 0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99 
Constant 
50 -3.58 -3.22 -2.93 .-260 -0.40 -0.03 0.29 0.66 
100 -3.51 -3.17 -2.89 -2.58 -0.42 -0.05 0.26 0.63 
Moreover, it is worth noting that we also can incorporate constant and/or time trend 
into the AR model above, the corresponding critical values are also given in Table 4.1. 
To account for serial correlation of errors, Dickey-Fuller test is carried out in the 
augmented model: 
(4.3) Ay, = y' yt-i +I<})jAy, +€, 
This version is termed augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
Engle-Granger Test and Johansen Method 
Let's denote differencing operator V=l-B. where B is the lag operator. If {V^X,} 
is stationary for some positive integer d but {V*^''X,} is nonstationary, we say that {Xt} is 
integrated of order d, or {X,}~ 1(d). 
If {Xt} is a k-variate time series, the 1(d) process{Xt} is said to be cointegrated 
with cointegration vector a if c^is a kx 1 vector such that {a X, } is of order less than d. 
People usually think about cointegration problem in the scenario of d=l. In this 
specific setting, cointegration test examines if there's a long-run equilibrium relationship 
among a few variables. It allows nonstationarity of variable itself but requires the 
stationarity of the linear combination of these variables. This property is often consistent 
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with the reality. For instance. Many important economical variables are 1(1) variables 
while there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship among them in that any deviation 
from this equilibrium cannot persist forever. The notion of cointegration captures the 
idea of univariate nonstationarity time series "moving together" and therefore has very 
wide applications. 
Engle and Granger (1987) suggested a two-step approach to testing cointegrated 
process. The first step involves fitting the long-run relationship by least squares. .A.s a 
second step, the hypothesis of no cointegration can then be tested by applying the 
Dickey-Fuller test to the residuals from the regression. If the residuals fail the test, the 
series are taken to be cointegrated. Otherwise, the specification would have to be 
reconsidered. 
It is worth noting here that it is not possible to use the Dickey-Fuller Tables 
themselves, the problem is that the residual sequence is generated from a regression 
equation. The researcher does not know the actual error only the estimate of the error. 
Fortimately, Engle and Granger provide test statistics that can be used to test the 
hypothesis. If more than two variables appear in the equilibrium relationship, the 
appropriate Tables are provided by Engle and Yoo (1987). If you use n variables and a 
sample size of 100, the Engle and Yoo (1987) critical values for two through three 
variables at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels are shown in Table 4.2, 
Table 4.2: The Engle-Yoo Critical Values 
N 1% 5% 10% 
2 -4.07 -3.37 -3.03 
3 -4.45 -3.93 -3.59 
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In analogy to the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, assuming that the 
diagnostic checks indicate the problem of serial correlation, the following expression 
can be used: 
(4.4) ACt = ai e,.i +Zai+iAe, _ 
where e, is the estimate of the residual sequence from the least square regression of the 
long-run equilibrium. 
Another popular cointegration test methodology is Johansen (1988) method. To 
state it briefly, consider equation (4.5): 
(4.5) Ax, = 7rx,.iV, 
where Xt and v, are (n x 1) vectors; :r is an (n x n) matrix of parameters. 
The first step of Johansen method is to estimate TI and to determine its rank. Equation 
(4.5) can take many different forms including the introduction of deterministic regressors, the 
addition of lagged changes in Axt Note that the rank of TT equals the number of cointegrating 
vectors. Hence, if we cannot reject the null of zero rank, we fail to reject the hypothesis of 
no cointegration. 
Asymmetric Regime 
Conventional unit-root test and cointegration test presuppose symmetric adjustment 
process. Note that in equation (4.2), y' is invariant with respect to y, or Ayt- In o±er words, 
the alternative hypothesis (i.e., y* * 0) implicitly assumes a symmetric adjustment process 
around yt =0 in that for any yt fK), Ayt+i always equal y* yt. Thus, y'yt can be viewed as an 
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attractor whose pull is strictly proportional to the absolute value of yt. Similar results hold in 
Engle-Granger test and Johansen test. 
This implicit assumption of symmetric adjustment is quite problematic given we 
observe that many important economic variables display asymmetric adjustment paths. E.g., 
Neftci (1984) showed U.S. unemployment displays asymmetric adjustment over the course 
of the business cycle. Terasvirta and Anderson (1992) find that industrial production in 13 
countries responds more sharply to negative shocks than to positive shocks. Similarly, 
Granger and Lee (1989) find that U.S. sales, production and inventories display asymmetric 
adjustment towards their long-run equilibriiun relationship. Potter (1995) models changes in 
real U.S. GNP as a threshold adjustment process and Balke and Tomby (1992) show that 
various short-term interest rates exhibit threshold cointegration. Moreover, the intervention to 
economy by central bank and/or government usually is not necessarily symmetric, e.g.. The 
Fed is more likely to take place when inflation rates are expected to rise than when they fall. 
Trade policy instruments are more often to be implemented when the country suffers a deficit 
than enjoys a surplus. Therefore, it seems to be appropriate to incorporate this asymmetric 
feature into the testing methodology. 
Sichel (1993) discussed two variations of asymmetry: "Sharpness" (steepness) 
versus "deepness". Sharpness occurs when contractions are steeper than expansions and 
deepness occurs when troughs are more pronounced than peaks. 
Corresponding to these two versions of asymmetry, by using the framework of 
Enders and Granger (1998), we introduce here two specific asymmetric models: Threshold 
Autoregressive (TAR) model and Momentiun Threshold Autoregressive (M-TAR) model. 
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TAR model can be expressed as follows: 
(4.6) Ay, =« 
P\y,-\ + if y,-x - 0 
{Piy,-x^e, if  <0 
A necessary condition for the stationarity of {yt} is -2<(pi, p2) <0. Reformulate (4.6) as: 
(4.7) Ay, = Pi It yt-i +p2 (1 -It) yt-i+e, 
where It is the Heaviside indicator fimction such that 
(4.8) I,  = 
1  if  y,_, > 0  
0 if >•„, < 0 
If the system is convergent, y, =0 is the long-run equilibrium value of the sequence. 
If yt-i is above its long-run equilibrium value, the adjustment is piyt-i and if y,.i is below 
long-run equilibrium, the adjustment is pzyt-i- Since adjustment is symmetric if pi=p2, 
symmetric scenario is a special case of asymmetry. 
Notice that the TAR model can capture aspects of "deep" movements in a 
sequence. If, for example, -2<pi<p2<0, the negative phase of the {y,} sequence will tend to 
be more persistent than the positive phase. 
If we replace Heaviside indicator function in equation (4.8) by the following 
expression: 
I if  Ay,-, ^0 
(4.9) I ,  = .  
0 if  Ay,_, <0 
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Equation (4.7) along with (4.9) are called M-TAR model. 
M-TAR model can explain "sharpness" property of a sequence. If, for example, 
!pt|<|p:|, the M-TAR model exhibits little decay for positive Ayt-i but substantial decay for 
negative Ayt.i. i.e., increases tend to persist but decreases tend to revert quickly toward the 
attractor. 
Asymmetric Unit-Root Test and Cointegration Test 
Development of Asymmetric Unit-Root Test 
Enders and Granger {1998) developed a new method which can be used to test the 
null hypothesis Ho; pi=p2=0 against the alternative of a TAR or an M-TAR model. They 
deduced the critical values via comprehensive Monte Carlo experiment. To realize this, they 
employ RATS software to generate 100,000 random walk processes of the following form 
for each sample size T. i.e., 
(4.10) yt=yt-i-St t=l, T 
where T= 50, 100, 250, and 1000. 
For each sample size T, a total of T+lOO normally distributed and uncorrelated 
pseudo-random numbers with standard deviation equal to unity were drawn to represent the 
sequence. Setting the initial value of the sequence (i.e., yo) equal to zero, the remaining 
values of {y,} were generated using (4.10). For each of the 100,000 series, the first 100 
realizations were discarded ( to get rid of the effect of initial value). TTie TAR model given 
by (4.7) and (4.8) was estimated and F-statistic for testing pi=p2 =0 was obtained. Then the 
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95% quantile of these F-statistics was found and this is the critical value for Ho: Pi=P2 =0 at 
5% significance level. Enders and Granger call this critical value <D-statistic. It's tabulated in 
Table 4.3. 
The same procedure was repeated for an M-TAR model using the indicator 
function given by (4.9). The corresponding F-test statistic, called <D*. are reported in the 
right-hand side of Table 4.3. 
Two additional sets of critical values are reported in Table 4.4. Table 4.4 is to test 
the null hypothesis of a random walk process with a non-zero sample mean against the 
alternative of TAR and M-TAR. 
Table 4.3; Enders-Granger Critical Values ~ and O* statistic 
O - statistic O - statistic 
90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 
50 3.30 4.12 6.09 2.98 3.81 5.79 
100 3.18 3.95 5.69 2.83 3.60 5.38 
Table 4.4: Enders-Granger Critical Values: and statistic 
1 
On -statistic cDn -statistic 
# 90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 
50 3.84 4.73 6.85 4.17 5.14 7.43 
100 3.79 4.64 6.57 4.11 5.02 7.10 
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Development of Asymmetric Cointegration Test 
Enders and Siklos (1998) deduced critical values for testing if there is a 
cointegration relationship among two variables and three variables in the asymmetric 
framework respectively. They conducted Monte-Carlo approach to do this. To see how it 
works, consider two-variable case. 30.000 sets of random walk processes of the following 
form were generated: 
(4.11) Xu=Xl.t.l-r Sit t=I, T 
(4.12) X2t = X2.t-i + e2t t=l T 
For T=100 and 500, two sets of T normally distributed and uncorrelated pseudo­
random numbers with standard deviation equal to unity were drawn to represent the {su} and 
{e2t} sequences. Setting the initial values of xuand X2t equal to zero, the next T values of each 
were generated using (4.11) and (4.12). For each of the 30,000 series, the TAR model given 
by (4.13) (4.14) (4.15) was estimated: 
(4.13) Xu=P2X2t-^Ht 
(4.14) A|it= Itpi|it-i -^(l-It) 
where 




if /"r-l < 0 
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and die F-Statistic for the null hypothesis pi=p2 = 0 were tabulated in Table 4.5. These 
critical values can be used to test the null hypothesis of a unit-root process against the 
alternative of a TAR model. 
Also note that the distribution of <I>-statistic depends on sample size, the number of 
lagged changes included in the dynamic adjustment equation, and the number of variables in 
the cointegrating relationship. See Table 4.5 for the different critical values corresponding to 
each combination of these factors. 
The Monte-Carlo experiment was repeated for an M-TAR model. The 
corresponding test statistics- called 0(M)- are reported in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.5: Enders-Siklos Critical Values— Distribution of O 
Two Variable Case 
No Lagged Change One Lagged Change Four Lagged Changes 
u 90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 
100 5.04 6.07 8.20 4.99 5.98 8.21 4.94 5.91 8.22 
Table 4.6: Enders-Siklos Critical Values—Distribution of 0(M) 
Two Variable Case 
No Lagged Change One Lagged Change Four Lagged Changes 
# 90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 
100 5.52 6.57 9.04 5.43 6.45 8.75 5.34 6.35 8.73 
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The Power Comparison Between Conventional Test Methodology 
and New Test Methodology 
The major flaw of the conventional unit-root test and cointegration test is the low 
power. Hence, it is of great interest to compare the power of the new methodology to the 
power of more traditional Dickey-Fuller test and Engle-Granger test. 
Dickey-Fuller Test and Enders-Granger Test 
To compare the powers of these two tests, for various values of pi and p:. 2500 
series were generated using: 
(4.16) Ayt= l,pi[yt-i-ao]+(l-It) p2[yt-rao]^t 
where 
^ 1 if y,-^ ^ 
(4.17) /, =j 
[0 if  y,_, < a, 
for T= 100. 
Each series was regressed on a constant and save the residuals I yt}. For each of 
the resulting { y,} series, the following regression equation was estimated: 
(4.18) A y, = Itpi yt+(l-It) p 2  yt +  St 
For each of the 2500 regressions, the sample statistics were calculated and 
compared to the appropriate critical values. The percentage of times that the null hypothesis 
was correctly rejected is reported in the central portion of Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7: Power Comparison between Dickey-Fuller Test and Enders-Granger Test 
PI P2 CT) DF 
10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
-0.05 -0.05 18.52 9.72 1.84 22.88 11.64 2.44 
-0.10 -0.10 46.24 28.48 8.08 53.56 33.44 8.96 
-0.10 -0.20 67.92 50.96 19.12 74.28 55.00 21.04 
-0.10 -0.50 90.88 80.44 48.96 92.36 81.20 48.80 
-O.IO -0.75 94.32 87.36 60.60 94.16 86.48 57.88 
-0.10 -1.50 98.44 96.04 82.60 98.40 94.96 '7.24 
For comparison, we estimate the following equation for each of the 2500 generated 
sequences: 
(4.19) Ay,= ao->-pyt.|-^t 
The t-statistic for the null of p =0 was compared to Dickey-FuIIer statistic. The 
percentage of times the Dickey-Fuller test correctly rejected the null hypothesis is shown in 
the right portion of Table 4.7. 
Inspection of Table 4.7 indicates that in general, Dickey-Fuller test dominates 
Enders-Granger test in tenns of power. This is true even in the presence of significant 
asymmetry. The performance of Enders-Granger test is better with the existence of extreme 
asymmetry, e.g., when pi —0.10, p2=-1.50, it performs sUghtly better than Dickey-Fuller test. 
The poor performance of Enders-Granger test is due to the use of a 2-step 
procedure and to the estimation of one additional coefficient as compared to the Dickey-
Fuller test. The resulting power loss dominates the gain from correctly specifying the model. 
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Table 4.8 reports results of power comparison using M-TAR model. Notice that the 
power of Enders-Granger test is often substantially larger than that of Dickey-Fuller test. 
However, when the true adjustment process is symmetric, the Dickey-Fuller test has great 
power than Enders-Granger test. 
Table 4.8; Power Comparison between Dickey-Fuller Test and Enders-Granger Test 
P; P: CD * DF 
10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
-0.025 -0.05 17.76 9.08 2.48 18.04 9.92 2.04 
-0.025 -0.10 32.00 18.88 4.72 28.48 15.12 3.56 
-0.025 -0.20 76.64 60.68 26.36 60.60 38.60 11.12 
-0.05 -0.05 20.84 11.20 2.72 22.88 11.64 2.44 
-0.05 -0.10 35.92 21.52 5.80 36.20 20.92 5.60 
-0.05 -0.20 76.28 58.96 25.08 68.64 46.52 13.96 
-0.10 -0.10 45.40 28.40 7.60 53.56 33.44 8.96 
-0.10 -0.20 79.04 63.48 25.96 80.72 62.60 24.92 
-0.10 -0.50 100.00 99.92 98.88 99.92 99.28 90.72 
Engle-Granger Test and Enders-Siklos Test 
Similar power comparison between Engle-Granger test and Enders-Siklos test was 
conducted and the results are reported in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. Note that the values in Table 
4.9 and Table 4.10 are the number of instances that the null hypothesis was correctly rejected 
out of 500 times. 
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Table 4.9;Power Comparison between Engle-Granger test and Enders-Siklos test. (TAR) 
p, p2 O Engle-Granger 
10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
-0.05 -0.05 8 4 2 11 3 0 
-0.05 -0.10 17 7 2 24 8 1 
-0.05 -0.25 66 27 3 84 28 2 
-0.10 -0.10 59 22 3 90 30 -> J 
-0.10 -0.25 310 151 22 351 191 19 
-0.25 -0.25 500 497 387 500 499 382 
Table 4.10: Power Companson between Engle-Granger test and Enders-Siklos test. (M-TAR) 
Pi P2 Engle-Granger 
10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
-0.05 -0.05 14 5 0 11 J 0 
-0.05 -0.10 57 22 4 32 8 1 
-0.05 -0.25 439 362 208 274 113 11 
-0.10 -0.025 79 42 6 11 4 0 
-0.10 -0.10 64 25 2 90 30 3 
-0.10 -0.25 465 398 177 439 306 42 
-0.25 -0.25 500 495 328 500 499 382 
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The overwhelming impression from Table 4.9 is that the power of the Engle-
Granger test usually exceeds that of the <D-statistic. But the situation changes a lot for the M-
TAR model. From Table 4.10, we conclude: 
(1) If adjustment is truly symmetric, the power of the Engle-Granger test generally 
exceeds that of the cI)(M) statistic in that the Enders-Siklos method entails the needless 
estimation of an additional coefficient with a consequent loss of power. 
(2) If adjustment is truly asymmetric, Enders-Siklos test dominates Engle-Granger 
test because of the correct specification of the model. Moreover, with the increase of the 
degree of asymmetry, the relative power of Enders-Siklos method increases as well. 
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CHAPTER 5. TESTING FOR PPP IN ASYMMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
Introdaction 
As indicated in chapter 2, even in the long run, empirical tests do not deliver strong support 
of PPP. The problem could come from two perspectives: first, conventional unit root tests (such 
as the Dickey-Fuller test) and cointegration tests (such as the Engle-Granger test) presuppose 
symmetric adjustment. As we have already shown in chapter 3. the assumption of symmetric 
adjustment seems inconsistent with behavior of national price levels. Secondly, national price 
indices (such as the CP! or GDP deflator) are each constructed by a national government using 
domestic weights. As such, changes in relative prices can cause measured deviations from PPP. 
Taking these rwo observations into account, we employ a new unit root test developed by Enders 
and Granger (1998) and a new cointegration test developed by Enders & Siklos (1998) as we 
introduced in chapter 4 to apply to a price level data that are constructed using the same weights 
across countries. One rationale behind PPP is the inter-country commoditv' arbitrage, which acts 
as an error correction mechanism to keep the exchange rate and-^or prices within a small range 
around an equilibrium attractor. The Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (1998) 
tests are particularly designed to incorporate the as\'mmetry of adjustment process. The use of 
the appropriately weighted price level data can avoid some of the measurement problems 
involved in most other studies. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic PPP 
and provides a review of conventional empirical testing methodology of PPP. Section 3 describes 
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testing procedure allowing for asymmetry based on the observance of asymmetric price 
adjustment. Specifically, threshold autoregressive (TAR) and momentum threshold 
autoregressive (M-TAR) tests for unit-roots and cointegration are discussed. Section 4 provides 
the detailed data description. Preliminary test results and interpretation of the results are given 
in Section 5. Section 6 is about error-correction estimation and impulse response function 
analysis. Section 7 explains why PPP fails in Germany-US case and Germany-Canada case. 
Basic Model 
Consider the following econometric model of Purchasing Power Parity: 
(5.1) e, = a + p,p, - pip; ^ 
where 
e, = logarithm of the domestic currency price of foreign exchange in period t relative to 
a base year; 
p, = logarithm of the domestic price level in period t; 
p, '= logarithm of the foreign price level in period t; 
1^, is a stochastic disturbance representing the deviation from PPP. 
The strong version of PPP implies that a = 0. p, = -ps =1 and that is stationary. 
However, in practice, the homogeneity restriction is often relaxed due to the presence of 
transportation costs and other trade barriers. Moreover, P, = -P^ = I is often relaxed also due 
to the possibility measurement error arising from such factors as using different weights in 
constructing the price indices. Equation (5.1), without imposing the coefficient restrictions, is 
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called weak-PPP. 
Existence of PPP is equivalent to the stationarity of |i,. If n, is not stationary, deviations 
from PPP contain a permanent component, such that the discrepancy from PPP is never fully 
eliminated. Instead, if is stationary, any deviation from PPP caimot persist forever. 
There are a number of different methodologies used to test for PPP. Among them the 
two most frequently used approaches are unit-root test and cointegration test. Unit-root test 
checks if the real exchange rate follows a random walk. If we reject the null hyporthesis of 
random walk, we conclude that PPP holds, otherwise PPP is rejected. The other most popular 
approach is to use cointegration test to determine whether there is a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between price levels and the exchange rate. It is widely acknowledged that e^ p, and 
p,' are I( 1) variables. Therefore, if |i, is 1(0), a linear combination of the three variables can be 
found that is stationary. Hence, for PPP to hold, there must exist a cointegration relationship 
between prices and the exchange rate. It is worth noting here: first, these two approaches both 
explicitly take into account the possible nonstationarity of prices and exchange rate, they both 
check if there is a unit root in the error term to equation (5.1). Second, these two approaches 
differ in that the former methodology imposes a= 0 and P, = -P; = 1 and the latter methodology 
estimates these parameters. 
The standard unit-root test is Dickey-Fuller test. To perform, first, do the following 
OLS regression: 
(5.2) Ar,= pr,., + e, 
where r, is the period-r real exchange rate (usually in logarithms). The null hypothesis 
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is p = 0, which implies that {r,} sequence follows random walk. The critical values can be found 
from Table 4.1. 
If there is serial correlation, equation (5.2) can be modified as: 
(5.3) Ar,= pr,.|+ Sp„,Ar,.,^6, 
Diagnostic checks, conventional F-tests, and/or model selection criteria such as the AIC 
or SBC a can be used to determine the appropriate lag length. 
The standard cointegration tests are Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1995). 
Engle and Granger test follows a three-step procedure: 
Step 1) Pretest the variables for their order of integration. (Dickey-Fuller test) 
Step 2) Estimate the long-run equilibrium relationship as stated in equation (5.1) 
Step 3) Perform the folloAving OLS regression: 
(5.4) p|i,., 
where the {|i,| sequence is the regression residuals from equation (5.1). The parameter 
of interest in equation (5.4) is p, if we fail to reject the null hypothesis p = 0, we can conclude 
that the exchange rate and the prices are not cointegrated so that PPP fails. The critical values 
are provided in Table 4.2. 
If the residuals of equation (5.4) do not appear to be white-noise, an augmented equation 
can be used instead of equation (5.4). Diagnostic checks and AIC/SBC criteria can be used to 
determine the lag length in the following autoregression: 
(5.5) A^,= p^,.,+ 
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Similarly, the Johansen (1995) methodology begins with a specification of the form: 
(5.6) AX,= Ttx,., + V, 
where x, is the (3 x 1) vector (e, p, pj)^. 
TT is a (3 X 3) matrix. 
and V, is a (3 X 1) vector of stationary disturbances that may be contemporaneously correlated. 
The first step is to estimate tz and to determine its rank. Equation (5.6) can take many 
different forms including the introduction of deterministic regressors, the addition of lagged 
changes in AX,. If we cannot reject the null of zero rank, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
prices and exchange rate are not cointegrated. 
Asymmetric Unit-Root Test and Cointegration Test 
Both Dickey-Fuller test and Engle-Granger test imply symmetric adjustment. Taking 
asymmetric price adjustment into consideration, the dynamic relationships implicit in the 
Dickey-Fuller (1979), Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1995) are misspecified. 
Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (1998) developed a number of unit-
root and cointegration tests that do not presuppose a linear-symmetric adjustment mechanism. 
They use comprehensive Monte-Carlo simulation to deduce the critical values. One of the 
appealing properties of these asymmetric models is the enhanced power of the test, compared 
with the conventional test when the true scenario is asymmetric. After all, many people attribute 
the empirical failure of PPP to the low power of standard test in discriminating between non-
stationary versus near stationary processes, i.e., the issue of whether real rates are slow-decaying 
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or unit-root process is hard to tell using only the conventional test methodology. A very 
important motivation of employing the asymmetric models is that this enhanced power may 
swing the conclusion of whether the PPP holds empirically. 
There are two variations for the asymmetric models depending on different Heaviside 
indicators. Namely, they are TAR (Threshold AutoRegressive) model and M-TAR(Momentum-
Threshold Autoregressive) model. In the TAR model, the deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium in equation (5.4) behave as a Threshold Autoregressive process. Consider modifying 
equation (5.2) such that: 
(5.7) Ar,= I, p, r,., + (l-IJpjr,., ^  e, 
where: I, is the Heaviside indicator: 
1 i f r  > 0 
C5.8) /,=[ 
In the M-TAR model, Heaviside indicator is defined as follows: 
The threshold models allow for differential speeds of adjustment depending on the 
current state of the real exchange rate. Critical values for the test p, = p, = 0 are contained in 
Enders and Granger (1998). Similarly, the residuals from the Engle-Granger test can be tested 
using the two Threshold models. Consider estimating the residuals from equation (5.1) as: 
(5.10) A^,= I, p, + (1-IJ p2^l,., + 6, 
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where I, is the Heaviside indicator such that: 
I i f  M,.,  ^ 0 
or; 
I //ah > 0 
0 , 0  
If we take a look at the TAR and M-TAR models, we know that the asymmetric adjustment is 
implied by different values of p, and p. For example. When r,., or ^.r,., is positive, the 
adjustment is p, r,.,, and if q., or AIJ., is negative, the adjustment is p, i^., . It is sufficient to 
guarantee the convergence of {r,} if -2 < ( p, , p ^ ) < 0. The critical values for the null 
hypothesis p, = p^ = 0 is tabulated by Enders and Granger (1998). Table 4.3 - 4.4. In addition, 
if the {r,} sequence is stationary, the least squares estimators of p and have an asymptotic 
multivariate normal distribution (Tong 1983). Therefore, if the null hypothesis p, = p, = 0 is 
rejected, it is then possible to test for symmetric adjustment (i.e., p, = pj) using a standard F-test. 
Similar statements can be made in cointegration test except for the fact that the cointegrating 
vector must be estimated from the data. The appropriate critical values are given by Enders and 
Siklos (1998). Table 4.5 and 4.6. 
Finally, to avoid any serial correlation in the error-terms, we allow the lag terms of Ar, and 
Ap., to enter into equation (5.7) and equation (5.10) respectively. Diagnostic checks of residuals 
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and AIC/SBC criteria are used to determine the appropriate lag length for individual pair of 
countries. 
Data Description 
The data set we employ in the paper set is highly unusual in that it is particularly well 
suited to study PPP [the data was generously made available to us by John Pippenger]. The 
annual exchange rate and price level data are from Intemationaler Verleich der Preise fur die 
Lebenshaltung published by the German Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). The series 
cover from 1927 to 1994 for a total of 68 observations. Because the data was published to adjust 
the salaries of German diplomats and foreign service people outside Germany, the price levels 
are constructed using weights that represent the typical spending pattern of a four-person family 
in Germany. Even though the price levels are constructed by only using cost of living in the 
capital of each country, this data has a very appealing property that makes it dominate other data 
sets in terms of testing for PPP, that is, equal weights are used for the goods in the basket on 
constructing the price index. 
Why is it so essential to require equal-weight data? We know basically PPP comes 
from "law of one price" for each good. In the absence of trade barriers and transportation costs, 
inter-country conunodity arbitrage ensures "law of one price", i.e., ep,' = p, where e is the 
domestic currency price of foreign currency; p,' and p; are the prices for good i in the foreign 
country and domestic country, respectively. It is possible to show that if the weights that are 
used to construct the price indices are same in the two coimtries, the "law of one price" implies 
die validity of purchasing power parity. 
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Suppose there are two countries A and B. They both use the same basket of goods to 
construct the price indices. The goods in the basket are good i (i=l,2, m). Without losing any 
generality, we denote country A as domestic country and country B as foreign country. Then, 
we have: 
p ( 5 1 3 )  r  ' ^ 2 ^  
/ >  • = p J > ' " '  15 ^2JB - 'nS 
where P,, is the price level of good i in country j. 
i=l,2 m; j=A,B. 
|i,, is the weight put on good i in country] such that: = 1. 
By law of one price, we have: eP,B= i=l,2 m. 
It is possible to show that PPP holds for all possible prices (i.e., eP* = P) if and only if 
M-ia = l^iB- Ths proof is straightforward. Substitute p^^ = ^P\b into the definition of 
P to obtain: 
(5 14) P =P "^-^P P r r r ^ J ma 
= eP * 
since the sum of the weights equals unity. 
Note that the typical tests of PPP do not use price levels constructed using equal weights. 
However, our data set uses equal weights for 221 goods and services. We have data available on 
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six countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK and US), hence have 15 different country 
pairs. For each pair of the countries, the level of exchange rate and the ratio of the level of the 
price index are published. Unfortunately, we do not have individual price levels for the various 
countries, instead, we have price ratios. 
Test Procedure and Interpretation of the Results 
The asymmetric TAR and M-TAR cointegration test is carried out using the following 
procedure: 
Step 1) Apply OLS to estimate following regression: 
(5.15) e, = a + pp, + n, 
where: e,= logarithm of the domestic currency price of foreign exchange in period t relative to 
a base year; 
p, = logarithm of the ratio of domestic price level and the foreign price level in period t; 
)i, is a stochastic disturbance representing the deviation from PPP. 
Step 2) Perform the OLS regression on equation (5.10) and (5.11) or (5.12). where {|i,} 
are the regression residuals from equation (5.15). Use diagnostic checks and AIC/SBC rule to 
determine the appropriate lag length of It is worth to note that threshold zero is appropriate 
because we argued in chapter 3 that price index displays positive asymmetry on the two sides 
of zero. 
Step 3) Use Enders-Siklos critical values listed in Table 4.5 and 4.6 to test the null 
hypothesis of p, = p2= 0. Notice that the critical values depend on the lag length as well as the 
number of variables in the regression. 
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If the null of p, = p2= 0 is rejected, we move on to test the symmetric assimiption p, 
= P2 by using standard F-test. 
Similarly, we can constrain the cointegrating vector such that we can test the stationarity 
of the real exchange rate in log form. 
Interpretation of the Results 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 report the test results for symmetric Engle-Granger cointegration test 
and asymmetric (TAR and M-TAR) Enders-Siklos cointegration test of purchasing power parity, 
respectively. Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 are the unit root test results regarding the stationarity of the 
log real exchange rates. To be specific. Table 5.4 contains Dickey-Fuller test results. Table 5.5 
reports Enders-Granger TAR model results while Table 5.6 reports Enders-Granger M-TAR 
model results. 
Interpretation of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
(1) By looking at Table 5.1. we found that using Enger-Granger test, PPP holds for 10 
out of 15 pairs of countries at 10% significance level, 7 at 5% level and 3 at 1% level. This is 
more positive evidenve in favor of PPP than conventional smdy. This improvement can be 
attributed to the better data set. 
(2) If we compare Table 5.1 with 5.2, we can see that the results of symmetric approach 
and asymmetric approach are pretty much similar in that for any pair of coimtries, the three 
methods ( Engle-Granger, Enders-Siklos TAR and Enders-Siklos M-TAR) almost always 
came up with the same conclusion with only one exception of France-Italy case. In France-
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Table 5.1: Engle-Granger Cointegration Test of Purchasing Power Parity' 
*Log form Engle-Granger Test 
P E-G statistic'' lag' AIC/SBC 
cus -0.24 -3.09* Iag=l -158.42/ -154.04 
CF -0.31 -3.73** lag=2 11.65/ 18.18 
CI -0.32 -3.79** lag=2 41.62/48.15 
CUK -0.15 -2.48 lag=l -60.66 / -56.29 
USF -0.34 -3.98** lag=2 4.62/ 11.14 
USI -0.39 -4.07*** lag=2 35.26 / 41.78 
USUK -0.22 -3.26* lag=l -62.77 -58.40 
DMUS -0.11 -2.47 lag=l -48.61 -44.23 
DMC -0.1 -2.33 lag=I -42.16/-37.78 
DMF -0.42 -4.45*** lag=3 -18.17 -9.53 
DMI -0.32 -3.38** lag=2 30.07 / 36.60 
DMUK -0.16 -2.92 Iag=l -93.25 / -88.87 
FI 1 P
 
-2.69 lag=0 -2.83 -0.63 
FUK -0.5 -4.64*** lag=3 -11.44, -2.80 
lUK -0.3 -3.23* lag=2 32.79 / 39.32 
* indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significancelevel. *** indicates 1% 
significance level. 
'' E-G statistic is the t-statistic for testing HQ; p = 0. 
' Optimal lag length is obtained by searching through no lag to four lags via AIC/SBC 
minimization rule. 
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Table 5.2: Enders-Siklos TAR-Model and M-TAR Model Cointegration Test of Purchasing 
Power Parity 
•log TAR model M-TAR model 
Pi' P: <I>-statistic AIC PI ' P: <I»(M) .\IC 
p-value of (lag) SBC p-value of (lag) SBC 
Pi = P: P. = P: 
CUS -0.32;'-0.16 5.41'* -160.14/ -OJ7/-0.09 7.01** -160.45 
(0.28) (lag=l) -153.52 (0.05) lag=l -153.9 
CF -0J7/-0.22 738** 12.87/ -0.34/-0.24 7.08" 13.25/ 
(0J5) (lag=2) 21.69 (0.54) lag=2 21.95 
CI -0.35,-0.25 7.30-*'* 44.33/ -0.55/-0.08 r.34*" 27.93. 
(0.55) (lag=2) 53.15 (0.00) lag=2 36.63 
CLX -0.14/-0.15 3.03 -59.67/ -0.11.-0.19 3.26 -59.13. 
(0.89) (lag=l) -53.05 (0.51) lag=l -52.56 
L'SF -0.40/-0.26 8.27**- 5.76/ -0.41/-0.22 8.61** 5.27/ 
(0.39) (lag=2) 14.57 (0.26) lag=2 13.97 
USI -0.44,-0.26 8.65'**'' 37.26/ -0.56/-0.02 1434*** 27.28/ 
(0.37) (lag=2) 46.08 (0.00) lag=2 35.98 
L'SLTC -0.22-0.22 5.24* -61.79/ -0.18/-0J2 5.84* -61.84/ 
(0.99) (lag=I) -55.17 (0J2) lag=I -55.27 
DML'S -0.12-0.11 3.01 -47.41, -0.17/-0.07 3.64 -47.81/ 
(0.94) (lag=l) -40.80 (0.28) Iag=l -41.24 
DMC -0.il/-0.10 2.67 •40.88/ -0.14,-0.07 2.9" -40.~5 
(0.90) (lag=l) -34.26 (0.45) lag=l -34.18 
DMF -0.61-0.30 12.26*** -21.56/ -0.61/-0.22 14.20*** -23.06/ 
(0.06) (lag=3) -10.54 (0.01) lag=3 -12.27 
DMI -0.47/-0.15 7_73«» 29.04, -0.53/-0.09 14.28*** 18.14/ 
(0.06) (lag=2) 37.86 (0.00) lag=2 26.83 
D\IL'K -0.16/-0.16 4.19 -92.72/ -0.15/-0.17 4.20 -91.27 
(0.99) (lag=l) -86.11 (0.87) lag=l -84,71 
FI -0.24/-0.13 3.88 -1.43/ -035/-0.07 8.18** -8.91/ 
(0.45) (lag=0) 2.98 (0.01) lag=0 -4.50 
FLTC -0.42/-0.56 11.02*** -11.07/ -0.43-0.55 10.87**- -9.88/ 
(0.43) {lag=3) -0.04 (0.52) lag=3 0.91 
lUK -0.16/-0.39 6.21 •• 33.62 -0.10/-0.54 14.16*** 20.12/ 
(0.18) (lag=2) 42.44 (0.00) lag=2 28.81 
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Italy case, only M-TAR model found 5% significance, which means PPP can only be 
detected by using M-TAR model. 
(3) However, we still can see asymmetric test methodology supports PPP more than 
Engle-Granger test. As a matter of fact, both of TAR model and M-TAR model provide at 
least as much evidence supporting PPP as Engle-Granger test. And moreover, stronger 
support can be found either from finding more cases for which PPP holds at the same 
significance level or from the ability to detect PPP in higher significance level for the same 
country pair. 
(4) We choose the best fitting asymmetric model for each pair of country via .AIC/SBC 
rule. They are marked by bold font in Table 5.2. Then we can make the following 
comparison as shown in Table 5.3. where the entries represent the number of pairs of 
countries for which PPP holds. 
Table 5.3: Comparison Between Engle-Granger Test and Best-fitting .A.symmetric 
Cointegration Test 
! 0% significance 5% significance I°'o significance 
Engle-Granger test 10 - 3 
Best Fitting test ! 1 10 6 
(TAR or M-TAR) 
(5) The optimal lag length are very consistent across these three tests. 
(6) From AIC/SBC, we can see that Engle-Granger test has smaller AIC/SBC for those 
country pairs accepting null hypothesis p, = p2. Asymmetric test has smaller AIC/SBC for 
those country pairs rejecting null hypothesis p, = p,. 
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(7) At 10% significance level, PPP fails for 4 pairs of countries. They are Canada-UK. 
Germany-US, Germany-Canada, Germany-UK. It is interesting to note that firsuGermany is 
involved in three cases. Secondly, three cases are between a North American country and an 
EC nation. 
(8) If we compare the estimated values of p and p,, p^, we fmd that p is always in 
between p, and pj. 
Interpretation of Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 
Table 5.4 is about the Dickey-Fuller test of the unit root in log real exchange rates. Table 
5.5 is the corresponding TAR model Enders-Granger test while Table 5.6 is M-TAR model 
Enders-Granger test. A few comments can be made based on test results. 
(I)  With log transformation of the real exchange rates data.  Dickey-Fuller test  found 
significant evidence in favor of PPP. At 5% significance level. PPP holds in 9 out of 15 pairs of 
countries. 
(2) For each of the 15 pairs, we choose the best fitting model fi'om the two asymmetric 
alternatives via AIC/SBC rule. They are marked by bold font in Table 5.5 and 5.6. Then we can 
make the following comparison as shown in Table 5.7, where the entries represent the number 
of pairs of countries for which PPP holds. 
It is straightforward to observe that asymmetric model works much better than Dickey-
Fuller test at 1% significance level, though this dominance is weak at 10% and 5% level. And 
moreover, if we take a look at the AIC/SBC values, we found smaller AIC/SBC in best fitting 
model than in Dickey-Fuller model in all pairs of countries except for one case: France-UK. It 
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Table 5.4: Dickey-Fuller Unit-Root Test of the Log Real Exchange Rates' 
*Log form Dickey -Fuller 
P t-statistic'' lag' AIC/SBC 
CUS -0.236 -3.09** lag=l -155.49/ -148.92 
CF -0.268 -3.43»» lag=2 14.79 / 23.48 
CI -0.329 -3.81*»» lag=2 43.79 / 52.48 
CUK -0.071 -1.48 lag=l -45.18/ -38.61 
USF -0.282 -3.53** lag=2 8.65 / 17.35 
USI -0.391 -4.09*** lag=2 37.33 / 46.02 
USUK -0.093 -1.89 lag=l -50.31 / -43.75 
DMUS -0.097 -2.28 lag=l -51.57/ -45.00 
DMC -0.084 -1.99 lag=I -44.38 / -37.81 
DMF -0.257 -3.34** lag=3 -7.85 / 2.94 
DMI -0.317 -3.39** lag=2 33.35 / 42.05 
DMUK -0.12 -2.41 lag=l -85.39 ' -78.82 
FI -0.187 -2.43 lag=l 0.92 / 7.48 
FUK -0.464 -4.48*** lag=3 -8.49 ; '2.31 
lUK -0.299 -3.20** lag=2 34.75 / 43.45 
* indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significancelevel, *** indicates 1% 
significance level. 
Dickey-Fuller statistic is the t-statistic for testing HQ; p = 0. 
Optimal lag length is obtained by searching through no lag to four lags via AIC/SBC 
minimization rule. 









cus -0.273/-0.164 5.23»* -156.0/ 
(0.45) (Iag=l) -149.5 
CF -1.257/-0.010 15J23*** 0.10/ 
(0.00) (lag=2) 8.86 
CI -0.668/-0.096 11.50*" 37.46/ 
(0.00) (lag=2) 46.21 
CUK -0.736y-0.031 3J1 -49.13/ 
(0.03) (lag=l) -42.56 
U S F  -1.594/-0.106 15.95*** -6.641 
(0.00) (lag=2) 2.12 
U S I  -0.877/-0.096 15.71*** 26.42/ 
(0.00) (lag=2) 35.18 
U S U K  -0.745/-0.031 3.67 -53.80/ 
(0.02) (lag=l) -47.23 
DMUS -0.055/-0.406 3.84 -53.75/ 
(0.06) (lag=l) -47.18 
DMC -0.051/-0-375 3.54 -46.99/ 
(0.07) (lag=l) -40.43 
DMF -0.958/-0.183 15.27*** -24.52/ 
(0.00) {Jag=3) -13.57 
DMI -0.578/-0.141 9.61*** 26.98/ 
(0.01) (lag=2) 35.74 
DMUK -0.502/-0.059 3.66 -86.79/ 
(0.05) (lag=I) -80.23 
FI -0.211/-0.142 3.09 0.71/ 
(0.66) (Iag=l) 7.28 
FUK -0.407/-0.339 6.81" -3.40/ 
(0.75) (lag=3) 7.54 
ruK -0.186/-0.266 4.26* 36.78/ 
(0.72) (lag=2) 45.54 
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Table 5.6 : Enders-Granger M-TAR Model Unit Root Test of the Log Real Exchange Rates 
•log 
p-value of 




cus -OJ19/-0.110 6.14** -157.65/ 
(O.IS) (lag=l) -151.08 
CF -0.216/-0.019 4.97* 16.73/ 
(0.07) (lag=2) 25.43 
CI -0370/0.049 12.21*** 35.93/ 
(0.00) (lag=2) 44.62 
CUK -0.034/-0.037 0.88 -44.35/ 
(0.96) (lag=l) -37.78 
USF -0.211/0.031 5.39** 10.68/ 
(0.02) (lag=l) 17.25 
USI -0.328/0.062 8.16**» 35.76/ 
(0.00) (lag=3) 46.56 
USUK -0.040/-0.028 0.89 -48.35/ 
(0.85) (lag=l) -41.79 
DMLS -0.087/-0.048 2.13 -50.48/ 
(0.57) (lag=l) -43.91 
DMC -0.068/-0.055 1.82 -43.68/ 
(0.85) (lag=l) -37.11 
DMF -0.449/0.053 14.23*** -21.97/ 
(0.00) (lag=3) -11.17 
DMI -0.520/0.100 15.06*** 18.50/ 
(0.00) (Iag=2) 27.20 
DMUK -0.134/-0.008 2.65 -84.88/ 
(0.15) (lag=l) -78.31 
PI -0J33/0.094 7.48*** -7.17/ 
(0.01) (Iag=l) -0.60 
FUK -0.211/-0349 5.86** -2.87/ 
(0.46) (Iag=2) 5.83 
ruK 0.101/-0.476 10.69*** 25J1/ 
(0.00) (lag=2) 34.01 
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is worth noting tliat for this case, the p-value of testing Ho; Pi = P; is 0.75 for TAR model and 
0.46 for M-TAR model. 
Table 5.1: Comparison between Dickey-Fuller test and best-fitting asymmetric unit-root tset 
10% significance 5% significance 1 % significance 
Dickey-Fuller test 9 9 3 
Best Fitting test !0 10 S 
(TAR or M-TAR^ 
(3) For all 10 cases we reject HQ: p, = P2 = 0 at 5% level, we move on to test symmetric 
hypothesis p, = p^. We reject the null of symmetry for 8 cases at 1% level. The results show that 
asymmetry is common. 
Asymmetric Error-Correction and Impulse Responses 
The positive finding of cointegration with asymmetric adjustment justifies the estimation 
of the asymmetric error correction model shown in the Table 5.8. 
The key feature in the Table 5.8 is the pattern of the estimated coefficients for z_plus and 
z minus. In all three cases, the t-statistics imply that the responsiveness of the exchange rate to 
error correction terms (both of positive and negative) are significant. e.g.,CanadaS/Lira rate 
falls(rises) whenever it lies above(below) its long-run PPP level. The point estimates indicate 
that this rate adjusts by 96.2% of a positive gap fix)m long-mn PPP and 55.4% of a negative gap. 
However, the interpretation of the price-ratio equation is somewhat difficult. The price 
ratio increases by 11.3% of a one-unit positive gap and increases by 43.3% of a one-unit negative 
gap from long-nm PPP. Thus, the price ratio adjusts in the "wrong" direction in response to a 
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negative discrepancy from long-run PPP. Overall, positive discrepancies are eliminated in a 
fashion that is substantially different from negative discrepancies. In response to a positive gap, 
the CanadaS/Lira rate declines and the Canada/Italy price ratio rises. Both adjustments act to 
eliminate the discrepancy from PPP. On the other hand, in response to a negative gap, the 
CanadaS/Lira rates moves more slighly and the price ratio even moves in the "wrong" direction. 
As such, there is less tendency for the negative gap to close. 
Table 5.8: Estimates of the Error-Correction Models^ 
Canada-Italv Case 
Ae, = -0.056 + 0.097Ae,., - O.lOSAPt., - 0.962z_plus,., - 0.554z_minus,., 
(-2.13) (0.70) (-0.50) (-5.27) (-4.11) 
= -0.058 - 0.009Ae,.I -i- 0.349Ap,., 0.113z_plus,., - 0.433z_mmus,.| 
(-2.71) (-0.08) (2.00) (0.76) (-3.94) 
US-halv Case 
J.E, = -0.057 0.110AE,.| - O.OSOAP,., - 0.997z_plus,., - 0.560z_mmus,., 
(-2.12) (0.73) (-0.36) (-4.72) (-3.77) 
:IP, = -0.053 + 0.002Ae,., 0.406AP,.| 0.182z_plus,., - 0.407z_mmus,.| 
(-2.46) (0.01) (2.26) (1.06) (-3.39) 
Italv - I J K  Case 
AC, = 0.031 - 0.02lAe,_, + 0.199AP,., - 0.386z_plus,., - 0.876z_minus,.| 
(1.19) (-0.13) (0.92) (-2.62) (-4.09) 
AP, = 0.033 - 0.034Ae,., + 0.538AP,., - 0.293z_plus,., + 0.205z_mmus,., 
(1.50) (-0.25) (2.91) (-2.32) (1.12) 
In this Error-Correction estimation, we use unbiased threshold via Chang's method. 
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The interpretation of the US-Italy case is pretty much similar to the Canada-Italy situation. 
However, Italy-UK case is kind of different in the sense that the Italy/UK price ratio adjusts in 
the "wrong" direction in respjonse to a positive gap rather than a negative gap. Hence, for Italy-
UK circumstance, the negative gap can be more easily to be closed than positive gap. 
In order to gain additional insight into the price ratio and exchange rate dynamics implied 
by equations in Table 5.8, let's take Italy/UK as example and consider the impulse response 
functions shown in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. As shown in Figure 5.1. a positive one-standard-
deviation Lira/pound rate shock opens a positive gap from long-run PPP, by observing the 
coefficients in error-correction equation, this gap leads to the depreciation of Lira/pound rate 
and decrease of the Italy/UK price ratio. The depreciation tendency of the rates narrows gap 
while the down-ward movement of the price ratio makes the gap even wider. However, by 
looking at the Figure, we conclude that the rate depreciates much faster than the drop of price 
ratio, i.e., die first tendency overpowers the second tendency, which means the gap is eliminated 
gradually overall. 
Figure 5.2 depicts the dynamic behavior of the rate and price ratio in response to one-
standard-deviation shock of the Italy/UK price ratio. Obviously, diis shock will open a negative 
gap from long-run PPP. The error-correction equation in Table 5.8 tells us that in response to 
this negative gap, the Lira/pound rate will go up and the Italy/UK price ratio will go down. This 
is consistent with the curvature in Figure 5.2 if you restrict yout attention from period zero to 
period one. At period one, there is a turning point for the exchange rate. What could happens 
here is that at this point, the negative gap suddenly becomes positive gap due to the appreciation 
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in the same direction, it's very likely that the correction maybe overshcoted such that a positive 
gap replaces the negative one. Once the gap becomes positive, the exchange rate goes down 
while the down-ward movement of the price ratio remains unchanged. But if we take a look at 
the adjustment speed of these two offsetting tendencies, we know that the exchange rate 
movement dominates the price-ratio movement, which closes the positive gap gradually. That's 
exactly what we can observe from the Figure. 
Why PPP Fails in Germany-US Case and Germany-Canada Case? 
General Explanation 
Our data set consisits of six countries, which enable us to do PPP test for 15 pairs of nations. 
Out of these six countries, four of them are EC nations, the two others are North American 
nations. We found PPP holds between US and Canada as well as between any two European 
countries except for Germany-UK. According to the cointegration test results, out of the four 
failure cases at 10% significance level, Germany is involved in three. Another interesting thing 
is three of these four cases (except for Germany-UK) happened between an EC nation and a 
north American country. 
A careful consideration about this will let us know it is not a coincidence. First of all, if 
there is any pair for which PPP tends to fail, it is most likely to happen between a north 
American country and an European coimtry. Why? after all, the most straightforward reason for 
PPP failure is the deviation from law of one price. Geography distance as well as the border 
between two nations incur transportation cost and various trade barriers, which is a straight 
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driving force for deviation from PPP. Engel and Rogers (1994) find that the variability in the 
price of a good in two different locations within a country depends on the distance between 
locations. Moreover, they find that holding other variables (including distance) constant, the 
variablity in prices between two U.S. or two Canadian cities is much less than between a 
Canadian and a U.S. city. Crossing the U.S. -Canadian border adds as much to the variability of 
prices as adding (a minimum) of 2500 miles between cities within a country. 
So we know distance is important, and crossing the border might be even more. Since the 
border between U.S. and Canada is equivalent to a 2500 miles, I would guess the border between 
Germany and Canada or U.S. worths much more. In addition, if you consider the whole Atlantic 
Ocean seperating Europe and North America, we should not feel too strange if we see PPP fails 
between a north America nation and an European nation. 
But why Germany is involved in most of failure cases? It seems that in addition to the 
distance and border factor, (particularly when you think about Germany-Uk), there got to be 
some other reasons. We propose here the high independence of the centred bank of Germany 
might be a key factor. We know the first priority of the Germany central bank is to control the 
inflation and keep the stability of the macroeconomy. As Dombusch (1982) showed, there is a 
trade-off between stability of the real exchange rate and price stability. If price stability is more 
prefered, then the stability of the real exchange rate could be sacrificed. 
Consider a case in which the German domestic price goes up, to fight against inflation, the 
central bank will tighten economy by raising interest rate, which in turn trigger a capital inflow 
and lead to a positive balance of payments. Hence the Mark should appreciate, which deviates 
PPP fiutheriy. This simple mechanism supplys a brief explanation about how the central bank's 
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priority goal could lead to the long run deviation from PPP. 
A Model Approach about the Trade-Off between the Stability of Real Exchange Rate 
and the Stability of Prices 
By extending Taylor (1979) model, Dombusch (1982) shows in the following that exchange 
rate rules that closely follow purchasing power parity do offset the employment effects of price 
disturbance, but they do so at the cost of increased instability of prices. 
Basic Model 
We assume an economy where employment is determined by demand and where the unit 
labor requirement is a constant a. Denoting employment by N, we have 
(5.16) N = a(D-M*) 
where D and M* are domestic and foreign demand for home output. Domestic price is 
determined by unit labor costs: 
(5.17) P = aW 
The trade balance is the difference between export receipts and import spending: 
(5.18) TB = PM*-P*eM 
where P* is the given foreign currency price of our imports, assumed constant and equal to unity, 
and e is the exchange rate. In addition, we assume: 
(5.19) D = D(P/e, WN/e, H/e); M = M(P/e, WN/e, H/e); M* = M*(P/e) 
where H is the money balance. So we assume the foreign import demand M* depends on the 
relative price (P/e), while both of domestic demand D and domestic import demand M depend 
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on realtive price P/e, income WN/e and money balance H/e. 
Combine (5.16), (5.17) and (5.19), we have: 
(5.20) N = N(W/e, H/e) N, < 0, N, > 0. 
The interpretation is: given the exchange rate and wage rates, a rise in the nominal money 
stock raises real balances, spending and employment. On the other hand, given money and the 
exchange rate, a rise in wages raises the relative and absolute price of domestic goods. With 
substitution effects dominating the real income effect, employment declines. Also we assume 
domestic exchange depreciation raises employment. 
Likewisely, we can write: 
(5.21) TB = TB(W/e, H/e) T,<0. T,<0. 
Accommodation and Macroeconomic Stability 
This part of work extends Taylor's model to the open economy, it can be shown that the 
monetary and exchange rate policies that accommodate price disturbances will tend to stabilize 
output, but they do so at the cost of increased persistence in wage and price disturbances. The 
intuition is that the wage-setting process is influenced by expectations about the extent to which 
policies are accommodating. The more policies are expected to accomodate, the less labor has 
to be concerned about the unemployment consequences of wage policy and hence the slower is 
the adjustment of wages and prices. 
The model studies deviations of output, relative prices and real balances from their long-nm 
equilibrium levels. Let y, h, p and e denote the logs of real output, nominal money, domestic 
prices and exchange rate respectively. Without losing any generality, we assume in long-run 
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equilibrium y = p = e = h = 0. We claim a key equation as follows; 
(5.22) y = a(e - p) + b(h -p)-^v a,b>0 
which says that equilibrium output is determined by the real exchange rate e-p, real balances h-p. 
and a random term v. Note that (5.22) is simply a linear version of (5.20). 
.\ccomodation policy rules are shown as: 
(5.23) h = pp e = YP 
where p and y represent the elasticities of the nominal money stock and the nominal exchange 
rate with respect to the price level. Thus if the price level doubled the authorities would 
accomodate the price disturbance by a IOOP% increase in nominal money and a I00Y% increase 
in the exchange rate. 
Substitute (5.23) into (5.22), we have: 
(5.24) y = -0p + v 0 = a(I-Y) b(I-p) 
(5.24), the reduced form equation for output, shows that an increase in the level of prices 
will reduce demand and output unless money and the exchange rates are fully accomodating, i.e.. 
P = Y = 1- With partial accomodation ( P, y^H, a rise in prices reduces real balances and 
appreciates the real exchange rate, therefore lowering demand for domestic output. The cofficient 
0 represents the responsiveness of output to price disturbances and varies between zero and one 
depending on the extent of accomodation. 
Taylor's model uses long-term, overlapping wage contracts combined with rational 
expectations as the framework for wage-price setting. In this model, there are two-period 
contracts and two groups, each having a contract coming up every other year for renegotiation. 
In this manner there are always two contracts overlapping, one in its first year, the other in its 
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second year. The group that sets a new wage has three points to notice. One is the ongoing 
second year contract that is still in force. The second is the new contract. The third point to 
consider is the unemployment consequence of current wage setting. 
The current wage contract x will thus be set with reference to ongoing contracts entered into 
last period, x.,, expected future contracts. and expected employment y and y®., during the 
length of the current contract. Here the superscript e denotes the expectation operator and u is 
an error term: 
(5.25) X = (l-d)x., -R d x^, - 6[(l-d)y' + d Y'.,] u 
where 6 represents the responsiveness of the wage contract to employment prospects. Note from 
(5.25) that wages are purely forward looking if d =1 and purely backward looking for d = 0. The 
term u represents random movements in wages. 
The price level is proportional to the average wage. The average wage in turn is formed by 
the currently effective contracts, x and x.,. Thus the price level can be set as: 
(5.26) p = 0.5(x^x,|) 
Now let us incorporate rational expectation into our model. Awaring of the fact that the 
rational expectation is a model-consistent expectation, we can derive from (5.24) and (5.26) by 
taking expectations: 
(5.27) / = -0.5e(x + X ,) y=., = -O.50(x - x"=.,) 
Combine (5.27) and (5.25), we get: 
(5.28) X® = (I-d)x^, dx",, - 6[O.5(l-d)0(x'' + x'.,) + O.5d0(x'' + x^,)] 
Collecting terms gives us an equation for wages: 
(5.29) (l-d)x®., - c x' + d x'., = 0, where cs(I+O.506)/(I-O.566) 
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with a solution: 
(5.30) x = px.i + u. pH(l/2d) {c-[c^-4d(l-d)]"^} 
Substitution of (5.30) into (5.26) yields: 
(5.31) p = pp., ^ 0.5(u+u,) 
Note that we can conclude I sc based on O£0<I. Furtheriy we can claim that p achieves its 
maximum value when c=l due to the fact that Pc<0. That is to say. If the accommodation is fully, 
i.e.. if c=l, then the price disturbances are the most persistent. 
In summary, a policy of maintaining near purchasing power parity implies that we follow 
price disturbances by accommodating exchange rate adjustments. Such a policy keeps the real 
exchange rate relatively constant and thus reduces the soiu-ce of employment variation. But 
because it prevents these employment effects, it abolishes much of the incentive for prices to 
return rapidly to their trend. PPP oriented exchange rate rules thus promote price level instability. 
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CHAPTER 6. HOW NECESSARY IS THE ASYMMETRIC MODEL? 
A FRACTIONAL COINTEGRATION TEST COMPARISON 
Introduction 
In chapter 5, we claimed that we found very positive evidence in favor of PPP due to two 
reasons: (1) a special-feature equal-weight data set which is more appropriate to test for PPP. and 
(2) the application of the asymmetric test methodology based on the awareness of the fact that 
the adjustment mechanism of the price index displays significant asymmetry. The gain due to 
second reason is the enhanced power of the asymmetric test methodology to detect asymmetric 
convergence. Now the question is: how much of the improvement can be attributed to this 
asymmetric test versus a better data set, if the latter plays a much more important role, then the 
focus of this paper on asymmetry would lose foundation. For example, what if we combine other 
more powerful test, such as fractional cointegration test, with this new data set? If the results 
turn out to support PPP enough, then the true scenario could be symmetric slow mean-reversion 
process rather than asyrrunetric threshold process. The fractional cointegration test based on 
spectral analysis can detect mean reversion more powerfully in that it allows for fi-actional 
integration, which exhibits reversion to a mean, but at a much slower rate than a stationary series. 
In the subsequent sections in this chapter, we'll give a description of the fi^ctional cointegration 
as well as the detailed test procedure. Of course, the test results are given and some conclusions 
are made based on that. 
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Fractional Integration and Fractional Cointegration 
Fractional Integartion 
A fractional integrated process allows the series to evolve according to; 
(6.1) <5(L)(1-L)%=i(;(L)€, 
where <I>(L) and tjr(L) are polynomial lag operators with roots outside the unit circle and e, is 
white noise. If 0<d<l, then we say the series X, is fractional integrated of order d. It is worth 
noting that the fractional integrated series exhibit reversion to a mean, but at a much slower rate 
than a stationary series. Cheung and Lai (1993b) find that the tests tend to have more power than 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests in detecting mean reversion, particularly for 0.35<d<0.65. 
Because many people claim that the convergence of long nm PPP tends to be very slow, this 
rather new fractional integration test and the correlated fractional cointegration test seem to be 
very suitful for testing PPP. 
A Test for Fractional Cointegration 
The hypothesis of fractional cointegration raises the problem of testing for fractional 
integration. Diebold and Rudebusch {1991) and Sowell (1990) observed that standard unit-root 
tests such as the Dickey-Fuller test may have low power against fractional alternatives. In our 
paper, a spectral regression-based test due to Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983) is used to detect 
fractional integration in the equilibrium error ji„ where n, is the least square residual of the 
cointegrating regression as implied by PPP. The detailed test procedure is as follows: 
Step 1) Estimate equation (6.2) as the cointegrating regression 
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(6.2) e,= a + pp,+ ^, 
where e, is the log of the exchange rate, p, is the log of the price ratio, and n, is the residuals. 
Step 2) Compute G, = (1-L)|J,, define the sample size of {p } as T, compute Fourier 
frequencies 0), = 2Tcj/T (j=0,.... T-1). 
Step 3) Estimate equation (6.3) as follows 
(6.3) ln(I(o)j)) = Po p,ln(4sin-( oj/2)) ~ e, 
where j = 1,2 n. n = g(T), is an increasing function of T. and I(cOj) is the periodogram at 
ordinate], which is defined as (6.4): 
r 
(6.4) /fo>p=(i5^ G,[(cos(rw )-jj/>i(rojp]|-)/r 
1 
Under some regularity conditions on g (T), satisfied by, for example. T** for 0<|i<l. Geweke and 
Porter-Hudak (1983) showed that the least squares estimate of P, provides a consistent estimate 
of (1-d) and hypothesis testing concerning the value of d can be based on the t statistic of the 
regression coefficient. Note that this result only holds for low-frequency range, that's why we 
need to introduce a transformation ftmction n = g(T) = T**. where 0<^<l. Easy to see, n< T. 
In testing for fractional cointegration, however, the critical values for the GPH test are 
nonstandard, and those derived from the standard distribution cannot be used directly to evaluate 
the GPH estimate of d. This is because is not actually observed but obtained from minimizing 
the residual variance of the cointegrating regression, and the residual series thus obtained tends 
to bias toward being stationary. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is therefore expected to 
be rejected more often than suggested by the normal size of the GPH test. To cope with the 
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problem, the empirical size of the GPH test in finite samples can be obtained using the 
simulation approach. 
Cheung and Lai (1993b) used the Monte Carlo method in 50,000 replications to get the 
critical values for GPH test corresponding to a sample size T=76. A range of values of ^ was 
used for the sample-size function n = T**. They report results for p. =.55..575. and.60. Table 6.1 
reproduce the empirical distribution of the GPH test for cointegration. 
Table 6.1: The Empirical Size of the GPH Test for Cointegration' 
Percentile(%) H=.55 H = 575 o if 
I -2.886 -2.9 -2.879 
5 -1.954 -1.955 -1.964 
10 -1.515 -1.52 -1.531 
^The sample size for the GPH spectral regression is given by n = T " where T =76. The empirical 
size is obtained based on 50.000 replications in simulation, assuming that the true system is of 
two noncointegrated random walk processes. 
The Fractional Cointegration Test for PPP 
Table 6.2 is the result of the GPH test for Purchasing Power Parity. 
The implication is very straightforward: fractional cointegration test finds PPP convergence 
in 7 out of 15 pairs of countries at 5% significance level. This number is exactly as same as the 
number in Engle-Granger test, i.e.. Fractional cointegration test does not provide more evidence 
in favor of PPP than conventional test. Therefore we can conclude that the real issue of 
conventional test is unawareness of the asymmetric adjustment mechanism rather than lack of 
power to detect very slow mean reversion. 
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Table 6.2:Results of the GPH Test for Fractional Cointegration' 
Country 
Pair 
H=.55 H = 575 |j. =.60 
d Ho:d=l d Ho:d=l d Ho;d=l 
CUS -0.004 -5.676* 0.04 -5.958* 0.073 -6.032* 
CF 0.594 -2.638* 0.607 -2.882* 0.658 -2.626* 
CI 0.756 -0.908 0.683 -1.288 0.735 -1.18 
CUK 0.634 -1.528 0.583 -1.93 0.627 -1.893 
USF 0.651 -1.434 0.807 -0.755 0.876 -0.522 
USI 0.102 -3.510* 0.123 -3.870* 0.206 -3.680* 
USUK 0.268 -2.118* 0.483 -1.44 0.499 -1.559 
DMUS 0.786 -1.304 0.787 -1.47 0.771 -1.759 
DMC 0.301 -1.564 0.269 -1.849 0.413 -1.562 
DMF 0.601 -1.514 0.673 -1.356 0.663 -1.564 
DMI -0.027 -5.127* -0.03 -5.833* 0.008 -6.134* 
DMUK 0.691 -2.312* 0.714 -2.400* 0.69 -2.848* 
FT -0.114 -6.847* -0.084 -7.426* 0 -6.641* 
FUK 0.505 -2.090* 0.639 -1.504 0.674 -1.5 
lUK 0.655 -2.021* 0.617 -2.482* 0.592 -2.921* 
•'The sample size for the GPH test is given by n = T'', where T = 67. Significance is indicated by 
* at the 5% level. The hypothesis HQ: d=l is tested against the one-sided alternative of d<l. 
Critical values are based on simulated values given in Table 6.1. 
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CHAPTER 7. MORE GENERAL OR MORE SPECIFIC? 
A FOURIER CONVERGENCE TEST COMPARISON 
Fourier Approximation of the Non-Linear Coefiicients 
In a very recent paper, Enders and Ludlow (1998) proposed a more general unit-root test and 
cointegration test which do not have to specify the fimctional form of the alternative hypothesis. 
This is in contrast to the linear specification in conventional tests and threshold specification in 
TAR and M-TAR tests. The point is often times we have no idea about how the convergence 
actually occurs, i.e., generally there is no reason to claim one specification is more preferred to 
another. By stating that a first-order Fourier approximation can capture many features of non­
linear convergence, Enders & Ludlow (1998) deduced a couple of sets of critical values via 
Monte-Carlo simulation which can test the null hypothesis of no convergence versus the general 
alternative hypothesis of convergence. They showed that the new test statistics have substantially 
more power than standard tests. To see it more clearly, let's consider a simple modification of 
the AR{ 1) model in which the autoregressive coefficient is a time-dependent function denoted 
by a(t): 
(7.1) y, = a(t)y,.ie, 
where e, is a white noise disturbance with constant variance and a(t) is a deterministic funtion 
of t. 
Under very weak conditions, the behavior of a(t) can be exactly represented by a sufficiently-
long Fourier series. For any desired level of accuracy, it is possible to write: 
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(7.2) a(r) =ao [a^sin^v+6,cos^-r] 
*=i I 1 
where n refers to the number of summands contained in the approximation of a(t) and e„(t) is the 
approximation error. 
In order to keep the problem tractable, we consider only a Fourier approximation for the case 
of n=l and k is any integer in the interval 1 to T/2. Hence, equation (7.2) reduces to: 
l-rrk '>TZk (7.3) a(r)=a-+a,sin-^^—-t+b.cos——-r w I I 
Enders & Ludlow (1998) showed that the convergence of {y,} depends on the relationship 
between o^, a, and b,. It has nothing to do with the frequency k. Specifically, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the convergence of the {y,} sequence is c< r^/4 and r < 2. where: 
c=ao-l 
(7.4) ^ T 
r=ya, 'b^ 
Fourier Convergence Test of Purchasing Power Parity 
To test for PPP, perform the following procedures: 
Step 1) regress the log real exchange rate on a constant and save the residuals or demeaned 
series as {r,}. 
Step 2) In order to select the most appropriate frequency k, estimate ±e following regression 
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using each interger value of k in the interval 1 to T/2: 
A  ^ X r • 271:^  , iTZk , (7.5) Ar(0=[c+a,sin—^•/+6,cos—+e^ 
The value of k resulting in the smallest residual sum of squares is called k* and the 
coefficients associated with that frequency are called c*, a,* and b,*. The t-statistic for the null 
hypothesis c*=0 was recorded along with the F-statistics for three different null hypotheses 
regarding various combinations of the coefficients. The F_all statistic tests the null hypothesis 
c*= a,* = b,* = 0. Similarly, the F_trig statistic tests the null hypothesis a,* = b,* = 0 and the 
t-test for the restriction c* = 0 is called the c* statistic. The value r* was calculated as [(a,*)-
^(b|*)-]'- and the test statistic for ±e non-linear restriction c* = (r^ /4 is called cr*. The 
distributions for these four statistics are reported by Enders and Ludlow (1998) for sample sizes 
of 50. 100 and. They are reproduced in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Unit Root Tests 
The F-all, „ Statistic The F-trig^ Statistic 
# 0.9 0.95 0.99 0.9 0.95 0.99 
50 5.79 6.59 8.65 5.94 6.81 8.91 
100 5.98 6.72 8.5 6.42 7.24 9.1 
Thec% Statistic The cr*y Satistic 
# 0.9 0.95 0.99 0.9 0.95 0.99 
50 -2.65 -3.07 -3.89 8.33 10.81 16.67 
100 -2.6 -3 -3.79 7.68 9.92 15.32 
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Interpretation of the Test Results 
The test results are reported in Table 7.2. Suppose we accept PPP only when both of the 
F_all statistic and cr* statistic are significant, then we can conclude that at 5% level. PPP is 
valid in 8 out of 15 pairs of countries. Comparing this with the fact that Dickey-Fuller test found 
the validity of PPP in 9 out of 15 pairs, we claim that Fourier convergence test does not perform 
better than conventional test in supporting PPP. However, this does not mean Fourier 
convergence test is useless, all it implies is that the Fourier convergence test might be too general 
in this fitting, given the theoretical awareness of the asymmetry of the price index. In other 
words, if we take into account the obvious dominant performance of the threshold model test 
over Dickey-Fuller test, we may realize that the threshold model does a much better job on 
catching the true adjustment mechanism than both of Dickey-Fuller test and Fourier convergence 
test. 
So there is no definite answer to the issue regarding whether the more general test or more 
specific test works better. It depends. If the specific one catches the true mechanism correctly, 
it sure will overpowers the general one. If the true scenario is misspecified. then the specific one 
will be bad. Therefore the good suggestion is: if we do have prior information about what is 
going on, specific model is preferred. If we don't have valuable prior information, use general 
approach, that is why Enders and Ludlow (1998) proposed the Fourier convergence test. 
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Table 7.2: Fourier Convergence Tests® 
cus 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags I 2 3 Lags 1 3 
P -0.235 -0.24 -0.276 c* -0.212 -0.210 -0.243 
(-3.01") (-2.84) (-3.04) {-2.90') (-2.61) (-2.84) 
Fall 6.88" 6.42 6.85 
Ftng 5.1 4.98 4.95 
cr* 10.29* S.46 9.72 
AIC -I5I.2 -149.3 -148.5 AIC -159 -157 -156.4 
SBC -I44.S -140.7 -137.8 SBC -150.5 -146.3 -143.5 
D-VV L99 L98 !.98 D-W 2 2.01 
0(2) 0.96 0.98 0.94 0(2) 0.98 0.98 0.93 
Q(4) 0.89 0.9 0.98 0(4) 0.85 0,85 0.89 
Q(8) 0.94 0.95 0.98 0(8) 0.64 0.64 0. 
CF 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags ! •) 3 Lags 1 1 3 
P -0.212 -0.285 -0.301 c* -0.165 -0.234 -0.249 
(-2.56) (-3.42") (-3.29) (-2.16) 1-3.00') (-2.91) 
F_all 7.17 S.Sl"' S.41 
F_mg 6.93 6.35" 6.23 
cr* 6.52 11.31" 10.53 
AIC 18.99 13.83 15.62 AIC 8.27 3.76 5.55 
SBC 25.42 22.4 26.34 SBC 16.84 14.48 18.41 
D-W 2.05 2.02 1.96 D-W 2.06 1.97 1.92 
Q(2) 0.11 0.9 0.87 0(2) 0.22 0.98 0.93 
Q(4) 0.19 0.83 0.92 0(4) 0.38 0.97 0.99 
0(8) 0.33 0.85 0.87 0(8) 0.08 0.45 0.43 
^ * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, *** indicates 1% 
significance level. 
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Table 12\ (continued) 
CI 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags 1 2 3 Lags 1 3 
P -0.251 -0.348 -0.344 c* -0.075 -0.152 -0.07 
(-2.70) (-3.88"*) (-3.41) (-1.03) (-2.01) (-0.81) 
F_all 21.35 22.58 23.13'" 
F_tng 25.53 21.2 24.2"' 
cr* 6.6 11.56 4.81 
AlC 51.54 41.76 43.75 AIC 14.65 9.43 7 
SBC 57.97 50.33 54,46 SBC 23.22 20.15 20.13 
D-W 1.92 1.98 D-W 1.79 1.91 
0(2) 0.04 0.97 0,96 0(2) 0.62 0.41 0.4 
Q(4) 0.07 0.97 0.98 0(4) 0.42 0.43 0.75 
Q(8) 0.11 0.78 0.78 0(8) 0.42 0.27 0.27 
CLK 
Dickey-Fuiler Test Founer Convergence 
Lags I 3 Lags I 3 
P -0.074 -0.093 -0.072 c* -0.05" -i).074 -0.066 
(-1.50) (-1.80) (-L34) (-1.16) (-1.49) (-1.26) 
F_all 3.69 4.44 3.41 
F_tng 4.28 4,7S 4.06 
cr* 1.87 2.95 2.07 
AIC -43.38 -42.97 -42.69 AIC -49.43 -50.23 -48.62 
SBC -36.95 -34.39 -31.98 SBC -40.86 -39.51 -35.76 
D-W 1.99 1.87 1.94 D-W 1.92 1.83 1.87 
Q(2) 0.44 0.96 1 0(2) 0.44 0.94 0.96 
Q(4) 0.62 0.88 1 0(4) 0.67 0.95 0.99 
Q(8) 0.86 0.9 0.99 0(8) 0.89 0.94 0.97 
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Table 7.2: (continued) 
USF 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags I 2 3 Lags 1 3 
P -0.229 -0.299 -0.315 c* -0.186 -0.255 -0.275 
(-2.76) (-3.54*-) (-3.38) (-2.39) (-3.21") (-3.16) 
F_ail 6.53 8.48" 8.09 
F_tng 5.5 5.51 5.49 
cr* 7.67 12.S" 12.14 
AIC 12.26 8.11 9.92 AIC 3.91 -0.57 1.07 
SBC 18.69 16.68 20.63 SBC 12.48 10.15 13.93 
D-W 2.05 2.03 1.98 D-W 2.06 2.03 1.97 
Q(2) 0.15 0.96 0.94 Q ( 2 )  0.22 0.96 0.95 
Q(4| 0.31 0.91 0.96 0(4) 0.36 0.97 0.99 
Q(8) 0.4 0.92 0.93 0(8) 0.1 0.54 0.54 
LSI 
Dickey-Fuller Tesi Founer Convergence 
Lags 1 3 Lags 1 1  3 
P -0.302 -0.416 -0.417 c" -0.099 -0.198 -0.103 
(-2.98) (-4.20"*) (-3.70) (-1.25) (-2.51) (-1.15) 
F_all 23.12 27.91 28.43"' 
F_tng 26.55 25.7 29.1"* 
cr* 9.09 17.53 8.13 
AIC 44.65 35.25 37.25 AIC 6.52 -2.54 -4.9 
SBC 51.08 43.82 4796 SBC 15.09 8.18 7.96 
D-W 1.92 2.01 2.01 D-W 1.89 1.68 1.75 
Q(2) 0.08 0.99 0.996 0(2) 0.08 0.62 0.87 
0(4) 0.09 0.99 0.99 (3(4) 0.07 0.61 0.99 
0(8) 0.11 0.86 0.86 0(8) 0.07 0.58 0.85 
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Table 7.2: (continued) 
USUK 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags 1 2 3 Lags 1 2 3 
P -0.096 -0.091 -0.086 c* -0.033 -0.025 -0.024 
(-I.9I) (-1.70) (-1.53) (-0.57) (-0.43) (-0.40) 
F_ail 6.03' 5.94 5.65 
F_tng 6.84" •".! 1 6.98 
cr* 0.91 0.68 0.62 
AIC -48.32 -46.41 -U.49 .A.IC -59.23 -57.98 -56.02 
SBC -41.89 -37.84 -33.77 SBC -50.66 -47.27 -43.16 
D-W 1.94 1.96 1.96 D-W 1.89 1.91 1.9 
Q ( 2 )  0.99 0.96 0.98 0(2) 0.71 0.98 0.99 
Q i - i )  0.9999 0.999 0.999 Q(4) 0.87 0.98 0.98 
Q ( S )  0.92 0.92 0.92 Q(8) 0.96 0.99 0.99 
DMUS 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags I 1  3 Lags 1 3 
P -0.103 -0.097 -0.0999 c* -0.098 -0.093 -0.098 
(-2.31) (-2.06) (-2.05) (-2.43) (-2.18) (-2.22) 
F_ail 6.S3" 6.34 6.31 
F_tng 7.06" 6.94 6.93 
cr* 
• •• 
• OO "QO —-AA 
AJC -19.42 -47.61 -45.68 A I C  -60.69 -58.85 -57.12 
SBC -42.99 -39.03 -34.96 SBC -52.12 -48.13 -44.27 
D-W" 1.94 1.98 1.99 D-W 2.03 2.06 2.08 
Q(2) 0.89 0.997 0.998 Q(2) 0.82 0.92 0.94 
Q(4) 0.78 0.83 0.86 0(4) 0.82 0.88 0.83 
Q(8) 0.95 0.98 0.98 0(8) 0.95 0.97 0.94 
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Table 7.2: (continued) 
DMC 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags 1 1 3 Lags 1 3 
p -0.088 -0.094 -0.081 c* -0.082 -0.089 -0.081 
(-1.999) (-2.04) (-1.70) (-1.96) (-2.04) (-1.80) 
F_all 4.51 459 3.86 
F_tng 4.56 4.56 4.17 
cr* 
AlC -43.47 -41.71 -40.89 AIC -50.1 -48.51 -47.06 
SBC -37.04 -33.13 -30.18 SBC -41.53 -37.79 -34.2 
D-VV 2.02 1.96 1.94 D-W 2.1 2.03 2.01 
Q(2) 0.79 0.98 0.95 Q(2) 0.83 0.96 0.86 
Q(4) 0.54 0.63 0.64 Q(4) 0.52 0.57 0.65 
0(8) 0.61 0.61 0.76 Q(8) 0.7 O." 0.82 
DMF 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags I 3 Lags 1 -> 3 
P -0.158 -0.206 -0.256 c* -0.295 -0.332 -0.382 
(-2.09) (-2.75) (-3.29") (-3.18) (-3.61) (-t.30'") 
F_all 14.33 14.86 18.71"" 
F_tng 18.05 16.48 19.15"* 
cr* 15.69 18.79 25.86"* 
AlC -1.46 -5.7 -7.63 AlC -29.52 -32.04 -38.01 
SBC 4.96 2.88 3.09 SBC -20.95 -21.32 -25.15 
D-W 1.95 2.15 1.93 D-W 1.82 2.07 1.91 
Q(2) 0.08 0.72 0.74 Q(2) 0.16 0.74 0.98 
Q(4) 0.1 0.18 0.86 Q(4) 0.29 0.26 0.91 
Q(8) 0.13 0.42 0.87 0(8) 0.62 0.53 0.97 
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Table 7.2; (continued) 
DMI 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags 1 2 3 Lags I -> 3 
P -0.233 -0.318 -0.334 c* -0.102 -0.189 -0.200 
(-2.40) (-3.34") (-3.20) (-1.18) (-2.30) (-2.21) 
F_all 10.96 15.18"" 14.53 
F_tng 12.42 I4.54"* 14.24 
cr* 4.89 11.51" 10.27 
AIC 39.74 32.52 34.34 AIC 19.61 S.91 10.82 
SBC 46.17 41.09 45.06 SBC 28.18 19.63 23.67 
D-W 1.84 2.03 1.98 D-W 2.13 2.34 2.3 
0(2) 0.08 0.83 0.89 0(2) 0.06 0.23 0 . 3 1  
0(4) 0.08 0.84 0.89 0(4) 0.05 0.05 0.09 
0(8) 0.17 0.88 0.91 0(8) 0.09 0.02 0.03 
DMUK 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags 1 • y  3 Lags 1 •> 3 
P -0.120 -0.098 -0.120 c* -0.091 -0.087 -0.104 
(-2.31) (-1.82) (-2.21) (-1.85) (-1.70) (-1.93) 
F_ail 5.35 3.S 3.59 
F_tng 4.97 3.86 2.78 
cr* 4.47 3.62 4.43 
AIC -81.88 -81.9 -83.02 AIC -89.66 -87.75 -86.84 
SBC -75.45 -73.33 -72.31 SBC -81.09 -77.03 -73.99 
D-W 1.86 1.9 2.01 D-W 1.91 1.93 1.94 
Q(2) 0.27 0.93 0.95 0(2) 0.92 0.98 0.98 
Q(4) 0.38 0.76 0.99 0(4) 0.9 0.9 0.98 
Q{8) 0.6 0.9 0.8 0(8) 0.74 0.75 0.72 
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Table 7.2; (continued) 
FI 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags i 2 3 Lags 1 -> 3 
P -0.185 -0.202 -0.200 c- -0.112 -0.098 -0.108 
(-2.34) (-2.43) (-2.29) (-1.66) (-1.35) (-1.42) 
F_all 11.36'" 11.34 10.99 
F_tng 13.15'" 12.81 12.76 
cr* 6.79 5.51 5.61 
AIC 0.74 2.22 4.22 AIC -20.47 -18.82 -17.08 
SBC 7.17 10.79 14.93 SBC -11.9 -8.11 -4.23 
D-W 1.99 1.99 L99 D-W 2.05 2.06 2.07 
Q(2) 0.83 0.998 0.998 0(2) 0.79 0.95 0.93 
0(4) 0.95 0.98 0.99 0(4) 0.85 0.94 0.93 
Q ( S )  0.96 0.98 0.98 0(8) 0.47 0.48 0,48 
FUK 
Dickcy-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags 1 3 Lags I 3 
P -0.296 -0.37- -0.467 c* -0.185 -0.247 -0,347 
(-3,01) (-3.76) (-4.36"') (-2.11) (-2.67) (-3.69") 
F_all 11.37 12.19 16.43"' 
Ftng 11.05 9.25 11.67"' 
cr* 10.36 13.48 22.44"' 
AIC -1.85 -5.81 -8.22 AIC -19.71 -21.05 -27.59 
SBC 4.58 2.76 2.49 SBC -11.14 -10.33 -14.73 
D-W 1.99 2.14 1.99 D-W 1.91 2.05 1.92 
Q(2) 0.21 0.81 0.997 0(2) 0.48 0.9 0.99 
Q(4) 0.31 0.53 0.97 0(4) 0.5 0.49 0.62 
0(8) 0.24 0.75 0.998 0(8) 0.2 0.31 0.67 
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Table 7.2: (continued) 
lUK 
Dickey-Fuller Test Founer Convergence 
Lags 1 2 3 Lags I •> 3 
P -0.235 -0.304 -0.287 c* -0.070 -0.132 -0.096 
(-2.44) (-3.16"") (-2.75) (-0.87) (-1.62) (-1.10) 
F_ail 15.96 I7.65"" 16.-5 
F_mg 19.16 18.5"* 18.98 
cr* 469 S.14 5.08 
AlC 38.25 33.82 35.59 .\IC 8.76 4.-8 5.48 
SBC 44.68 42.39 46.31 SBC ! 7.33 15.49 1S.34 
DAV !.84 1.93 1.99 D-W 2.07 2.03 2.16 
0(2) 0.2 0.88 0.84 0(2) 0.12 0.67 0.41 
0(4) 0.12 0.89 0.87 0(4) 0.1 0.63 0.65 
0(8) 0.43 0.84 0.87 0(8) 0.08 0.09 0.! 1 
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CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY 
This dissertation focuses on testing purchasing power parity. The special feature of the paper 
is that we jump from linear to nonlinear approach. Theoretical progress recently made by Enders 
& Granger (1998), Enders & Siklos (1998) and Enders & Ludlow (1998) triggered our research 
on this topic. The empirical results are quite consistent to our theoretical expectation or can be 
reasonably explained. It is worth noting that our RATS results are very supportive to the validity 
of PPP. which is in very contrast to the previous empirical finding. 
However, we carmot give all credits to the application of this nonlinear approach. .A.s a 
matter of fact, another special characteristic of this dissertation is that all through the paper, we 
use a very nice constructed data set provided by John Pippenger. We argued in chapter five that 
this equal-weight data set is particularly appropriate to testing for PPP. 
So the benefit comes from two perspectives: a better model which captures the asymmetric 
adjustment mechanism of price index and a better data set. We know both of them contribute to 
the empirical success, but since we spend so much time on TAR model and M-TAR model, it 
is to our great interest to make sure the contribution of the better model is not trivial. Toward this 
end, a fractional cointegration test is applied to the same data set in chapter six for a comparison 
purpose. We found that the more powerful slow-mean-reversion detecting method did not work 
better than Engle-Granger test. Therefore we claim that the attention on the asymmetric test 
methodology should be given. 
Another interesting comparison as we did in chapter seven is the comparison between a very 
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general Fourier convergence test and more specific threshold model test. It seems that in this 
case, the general model is not very much preferred to conventional test, let alone the threshold 
model. The basic sense behind this is if we do have theoretical prior information regarding the 
real struture of the model, like what we carefully reviewed in chapter three, a correct specific 
model is the best choice. On the other hand, if we don't have valuable information about what 
is going on, like often times happened in the real world, a more general approximation could be 
better, it could be a second best in contrast to the real model, but it surely will be much better 
than a wrongly specified model. 
I l l  
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